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 11. Introduction 
The development and introduction of the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) has instigated intensive 
and heated debates in many countries and industries. Some fear that the Accord will be counterproductive, 
others and by far the majority believe that it will establish safer and healthier banking systems in the 
medium and long run. Discussions have also concentrated on the question which banks will be among the 
winners and which among the losers. Risk magazine concluded that the Swiss and UK banks were set to 
win, but the Japanese to lose under Basel II [Risk (2002a)]. One does not need much imagination to 
conclude that over the past 10 years or so, Japanese banks could not be typified as being in a winning 
position. Saddled with bad loans and eroded capital positions, they had to retreat from international 
markets and put all their efforts into the resolution of their problems. Taking this into account, some argue 
that Basel II is not of direct relevance for Japanese banks yet, and that banks in Japan have other things to 
worry about right now than the New Capital Accord. Or, as it has been put more aptly, it is simply “a 
question of priorities” [Risk (2002b)]. 
  Although this certainly may be correct, at least to some extent, Japanese banks know that they 
will be confronted with a new capital regulatory framework in the foreseeable future. Therefore, they 
need to prepare and one can simply not believe that Basel II considerations do not play some role in 
Japanese banks’ strategic considerations and operational practices. Thus, this chapter investigates the 
possible implications for Japanese banks of the development and implementation of the New Basel 
Capital Accord. To this purpose, we have followed a qualitative research strategy consisting of the 
following elements. First, a detailed analysis of the relevant academic literature was conducted. Second, 
this was augmented by a structural investigation of relevant publications by the financial industry. This 
includes the work of the Basel Committee itself and the various consultation rounds related to that work, 
and various reports filed by major commercial and investment banks, rating organizations and 
international and national policymaking bodies. It also includes investigations of industry-specific 
publications such as Risk magazine. Third, a day-by-day search of major related daily news publications 
was conducted, in order to identify specific trends that could provide information regarding the short-term 
(tactical) and long-term (strategic) implications of Basel II for Japanese banking. This approach is based 
on the well-known trend-analysis developed by John Naisbitt [see Naisbitt (1984)]. The publications that 
were investigated were in particular the main Japanese financial daily (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, NKS) 
through the Nikkei Net System (NNS) and the Financial Times (FT). Fourth, to fill existing information 
gaps, we conducted interviews with key-individuals active in the Japanese financial system. In total 21 
interviews were conducted with representatives from Japanese commercial banks, Japanese and 
international rating agencies, policy-makers and banking analysts from major investment banks. All in all, 
given the inherent uncertainty related to Basel II, i.e. the Accord is not in a steady state yet, we felt that 
 2this was the most fruitful approach to follow. 
  The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, a general overview of certain specific elements of 
Basel II is presented. Second, the characteristics of the Japanese banking system and its main problems 
are discussed for the major banks in particular. Third, the impact of the Original (1988) Capital Accord on 
Japanese banking is investigated. Fourth, the formal reactions of Japanese banks published on the Basel 
Committee’s website are analyzed. Then, the tactical and strategic implications of Basel II for the 
Japanese banking industry are discussed, merging all the information obtained. Finally, some conclusions 
are presented.  
 
2. The main characteristics of the New Basel Capital Accord 
The New Basel Capital Accord basically addresses only the denominator, i.e. risk-weighted assets, of the 
capital adequacy ratios that were the cornerstone of the first Basel Accord of 1988, and leaves 
fundamentally the numerator, that is bank capital, alone. In its essence, the New Accord consists of three 
mutually reinforcing pillars affording better protection to the stability of the national and international 
banking systems, and can be summarized as follows [see for example: Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (1999), (2001a), (2001b) and (2003a); Claessens and Embrechts (2002); Credit (2001); 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2001); ECB (2001b); Kupiec (2001a) and (2001b); Jackson (2001); JP Morgan 
Securities (2001); Risk (2001a); Bank of Japan (2003h); EDS (2003); McDonough (2003); Morgan 
Stanley (2003a) and (2003b)]. Pillar 1 sets out the minimum capital requirements. Compliance with these 
requirements is measured by using the “capital ratio”, which must be no lower than 8%. Pillar 2 concerns 
the so-called Supervisory Review process. This clarifies the need for qualitative banking supervision and 
is designed to capture external factors, such as the influence of the business cycle, as well as risk areas 
which have not been taken into consideration when calculating the minimum capital requirements. The 
provisions on minimum capital requirements – pillar 1 – and the supervisory review process – pillar 2 – 
are joined by transparency requirements which form the third pillar of the New Accord. These are 
designed to allow for a complementary use of market mechanisms for regulatory objectives. This concept 
is based on the expectation that well-informed market players will reward credit institutions characterized 
by effective risk-management of their investment and credit decisions on the one hand and penalize 
riskier behavior on the other hand. This provides credit institutions with additional incentives to control 
and manage efficiently their risks.  
The New Capital Accord allows financial institutions to estimate the probability of default (PD) 
associated with each borrower according to its business conditions and hold capital based on such 
estimates [Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001a)]. In the Accord a mechanism is introduced 
that acknowledges any deterioration in the value of financial institution’s loan assets at an early stage and 
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project and any other change in the degree of risk. This mechanism, which is called the internal ratings-
based approach (IRB), produces a statistical measurement of both the unexpected losses and the expected 
losses that banks face in relation to their credit risk exposures. Consequently, the measurement of the 
amount of risk-weighted assets would be based solely on the unexpected loss portion of the IRB 
calculations. Then banks will compare the IRB measurement of expected losses with the total amount of 
provisions that they have made. For any bank, this comparison will produce a “shortfall” if the expected 
loss amount exceeds the total amount of provisions, or an “excess” if the total amount of provisions 
exceeds the expected loss amount. The shortfall amount will be deducted from Tier 1 capital by 50% and 
by the same amount from Tier 2 capital [Risk (2003c)]. 
The proposed New Capital Accord gives banks three options for assessing credit risk. First, the 
standardized approach, tailored for smaller, less sophisticated banks, uses ratings provided by agencies to 
determine capital requirements. Companies rated BBB or BB would have a risk weighting of 100%, 
requiring a capital charge of 8%, while a company rated AA would have a risk weighting of 20%, 
requiring a capital charge of just 1.6%. Second, under the foundation IRB method, banks estimate the 
probability of default (PD) for their borrowers and then use figures provided by prudential supervisors for 
loss given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD) and maturity (M) to calculate capital requirements. 
Third, under the advanced IRB approach, banks use their own estimates for all the above mentioned 
variables. To qualify for the advanced approach, banks need to collect several years of data on the 
performance of their borrowers to demonstrate to supervisors the soundness and reliability of their rating 
systems [Institutional Investor (2003)]. 
Another major innovation in the New Capital Accord is the explicit inclusion of operational risk, 
which is defined as “… the risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people or 
systems, or external events” [Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003a)]. The Accord gives banks 
three alternatives for operational risk. The basic indicator and standardized approaches link the 
operational risk charge to a bank’s gross income. The advanced measurement approach allows banks to 
determine their own operational risk charge if they can meet strict requirements that include having well-
tested risk control systems and detailed historical data.
4  
An important impact of the New Capital Accord’s capital regulation is the effect on financial pro-
cyclicality [see for example ECB (2001b)]. The minimum capital requirement may become binding in a 
downturn if banks’ capital ratios fall close to the 8% level. The capital shortage may induce banks to 
reduce lending beyond what would be warranted on the basis of the reduced demand for loans in an 
economic downturn. The quantitative impact on the actual regulatory capital requirements would depend 
                                                  
4 For interesting views on how to implement capital requirements in relation to operational risk see Mori et. al. (2000a) and 
(2000b), and Mori and Harada (2000) and (2001). See also Risk (2003b). 
 4on the portfolio composition of individual banks. The increase in the minimum required amount of capital 
under the IRB approach might be substantial in a deteriorating economic environment, on account of the 
element of volatility of the probability of default measures. Hence, banks could face increasing capital 
needs in periods when capital is most costly and could choose to reduce assets instead, which might make 
the downturn more pronounced.  
Another important characteristic of the New Basel Capital Accord is that it tries to block the 
practice of regulatory arbitrage, that is it tries to block effectively that banks take greater economic risks 
by diversifying into more risky assets and activities which do not lead to higher capital requirements, 
which was possible to a considerable extent under Basel I. Regarding the latter, Rodriguez (2002) argued 
that the “existence of risk categories that create a divergence between economic risks and measures of 
regulatory capital has led to widespread regulatory capital arbitrage”.
5 
With respect to bank capital, i.e. the numerator of the capital adequacy ratio which as mentioned 
before remains basically untouched, Basel II follows Basel I and provides a common international 
definition of bank capital that divides capital into two tiers. Tier 1 capital is common to all of the 
signatory countries, thus making it useful for cross-country comparisons. It consists of common stock-
holder equity and disclosed reserves (except for some forms of preferred stock that US bank holding 
companies take into account). Tier 2 capital, which consists of leeway elements that at least one of the 
signatory countries considered to be bank capital, can include any combination of the eligible capital 
elements permitted by the national regulators. Tier 3 capital is short term subordinated debt (maturity 
between 2 and 5 years) that can be used to support a bank’s capital requirements arising from market risks 
on trading book activities [see for example JP Morgan Securities (2002)]. The amendment to the Capital 
Accord to incorporate market risks in January 1996 was designed to capture the various market risks 
borne by financial institutions and introduced capital charges for them [BIS (1996)]. The amendment 
permits a bank to divide its business between its term lending and deposit-taking activities, known as the 
“banking book”, and its trading activities, known as the “trading book”. Tier 3 capital may not be set 
against credit risk, only against market risk capital requirements.  
In October 2002, the Basel committee initiated a study involving 365 banks across 43 countries, 
including 66 Japanese banks, to gauge the impact of Pillar 1. The results were released in May 2003 in the 
Quantitative Impact Study No.3 (QIS 3) and are broadly in line with the objectives of the Accord [Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2003b)]. The minimum capital requirements would be broadly 
unchanged for large internationally banks taking into account the fact that they are more likely to use the 
IRB approaches. For smaller, more domestically oriented G10 and EU banks, capital requirements could 
be substantially lower under the two IRB approaches, largely reflecting the importance of retail business 
for these banks. Thus banks oriented on retail business will see their credit risk weights fall significantly. 
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50% to 35% and on retail and SME (small- and medium-sized enterprises) lending from 100% to 75%. 
Also weights will differ according to the size of the borrowers, with larger risk-weights for large 
corporate borrowers. The discussion of the treatment of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
under the new Accord has been extremely difficult. The Basel Committee decided in July 2002 to 
differentiate between risk weights applied to loans to SMEs and loans to larger firms [see Rodriguez 
(2002), p.24]. Another aspect of the proposed weighting scheme is that risk-weights will be lower for 
non-performing loans which are covered by adequate provisions, i.e. generating an incentive for banks to 
develop and maintain adequate provisioning levels.  
After the completion of the consultations on the Third Consultative Paper (CP3), which was 
published in April 2003, and in interaction with the results of QIS 3, the Basel Committee aims to resolve 
the outstanding issues by no later than mid-year 2004 with the view of full implementation of the rules by 
the end of 2006 [Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003d)]. The areas where more work will be 
done are the following. First, changing the treatment of expected versus unexpected credit losses. Second, 
simplifying the treatment of asset securitization, including eliminating the so-called “Supervisory 
Formula”.
6 Third, reviewing of how to handle loans related to credit card business. Fourth, reviewing 
certain credit risk mitigation techniques. Given the inherent uncertainty at this stage, it is clear that this 
chapter cannot present a final assessment of these areas. According to the Federal Reserve Board (2003) 
implementation of the rules will happen differently for each bank as it is more important to “do it right” 
rather than “doing it quickly”. 
  Not surprisingly, similar to the experience with the 1988 Basel Accord, the New Basel Capital 
Accord has been increasingly the topic of research by major banks, supervisory and monetary authorities, 
and academics.
7 A full overview of this work is beyond the scope of this chapter but in the context of the 
research objective pursued, the following can be mentioned.
8  
First, a significant number of studies focus on the pro-cyclicality of Basel II. Reisen (2001) 
argued that speculative-grade borrowers will suffer from a dramatic rise in debt costs and heightened 
cyclicality of global bank credit as a result of Basel II, if the internal rating approach is implemented. On 
the same issue of the importance of cyclicality is ECB (2001b), where again it is argued that banks 
estimates of probabilities of default would likely vary over time and depend on economic cycles, and that 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5 See also D. Jones (2000).  
6 A supervisory formula has been developed for treating retained or purchased exposures in traditional and synthetic 
securitizations where an external or qualified inferred rating is not available. The applicability of the supervisory formula 
approach will depend primarily on the requirements for calculating the IRB capital charge for the underlying asset type [Basel 
Banking Supervision Committee (2001c)]. 
7  For academic research regarding the general role of capital and risk-based capital requirements, and impact of these 
requirements on banks see for example: Lackman (1986); Wall and Peterson (1987); Cooper et. al. (1991); Shrieves and Dahl 
(1992); Berger et. al. (1995); Wagster (1996); Ieda and Ohba (1999); Hellmann et. al. (2000); Hammes and Shapiro (2001); 
Barrios and Blanco (2003); Gup (2003); Ishikawa et. al. (2003). 
 6the New Accord probably could increase pro-cyclicality [see also Danielson et. al. (2001)]. A comparison 
of pro-cyclicality effects  of both Basel I and Basel II is made in Heid (2003) where it is argued that the 
feared increase in volatility of actual capital and output did not materialize under Basel I but most likely 
will occur under Basel II. Corcóstegui et. al. (2003) investigated internal rating systems and proposed 
solutions for the pro-cyclical bias in the New Accord. Altman and Saunders (2001) argued that the agency 
ratings could produce cyclically lagging rather leading capital requirements, resulting to instability in the 
banking system. Second, regarding other aspects of Basel II, Mori and Harada (2001) described a 
methodology that quantifies risk mitigation effects by insurance in Pillar 1 capital charges. The authors 
recognized that developing a rigorous methodology to incorporate insurance effects is critical for the 
purpose of making the regulatory framework risk sensitive.  
To conclude, the banks that most likely will be the winners under Basel II (i.e. banks that will see 
their risk-weighted assets decrease and thus experience an improvement in capital adequacy ratios) will be 
banks which have substantial retail operations, with high shares of their total lending consisting of consumer 
loans, residential mortgages and loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME’s), banks which have 
adequate provisioning schemes for non-performing loans, and banks which have the resources to develop the 
(costly) internal rating systems (i.e. most likely the largest banks), as the IRB approach will lower capital 
charges compared with the standardized approach [See also Morgan Stanley (2003b)]. 
 
3. The Japanese banking sector 
3.1 Overview 
The Japanese banking industry has been extensively discussed in a large number of studies [for some recent 
examples see: Hayami (2002a); Van Rixtel (2002); Basel Committee (2003c); Calomiris and Mason (2003); 
Credit Suisse First Boston (2003d); Hanazaki et. al. (2003); Van Rixtel et. al. (2003)]. In the context of this 
contribution, only its main characteristics will be described in order to assess the possible impact of the New 
Basel Capital Accord on the Japanese banking sector. 
  The structure of the Japanese banking system is characterized, firstly, by the presence of a very small 
number of very large banking groups and a very large number of very small institutions, and secondly by a 
sharp decline of the total number of institutions over the past years. The increased concentration in the 
Japanese banking sector, which is shown in Table 1, has affected in particular the city and Second Tier 
regional banks among the major banks, and smaller financial institutions such as shinkin banks, and credit, 
agriculture and forestry co-operatives. These institutions perform the following functions. The major 
banks in Japan are the commercial or ordinary banks, whose activities are set by the Banking Law. These 
                                                                                                                                                                  
8 Where possible, studies focusing on Japan or conducted by Japanese authors will be presented. 
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banks are the largest of all commercial banks; their funding consists basically of deposits, direct credit 
from the BoJ and borrowings from the inter-bank markets. The regional banks have their headquarters 
predominantly throughout the country in smaller cities, and mostly operate in local areas. The member 
banks of the Second Association of Regional Banks, or the Second Tier regional banks, are former sogo 
or mutual savings banks, all of which were changed in commercial banks in February 1989. Within the 
group of the so-called long-term financial institutions, the long-term credit banks or LTCBs have been the 
most important banks, of which originally three existed (only two left as of end-March 2003). The trust 
banks are also long-term financial institutions, and were, unlike the LTCBs, permitted to conduct both 
ordinary banking and trust business. In addition, financial institutions for small businesses exist which 
comprise of three groups, i.e. credit associations or shinkin banks, credit co-operatives and the Central 
Co-operative Bank for Commerce and Industry (Shoko Chukin Bank). Finally, the financial institutions 
for agriculture, forestry and fishery provide financial services to their respective members on a mutual 
base. The Norinchukin Bank acts as the umbrella organization for these institutions. 
  The city banks, one long-term credit bank, most of the trust banks and some regional banks and 
smaller financial institutions have organized themselves through an intensive merger process in seven 
bank conglomerates, of which the top four in particular dominate the Japanese market.
9 The  most 
significant merger was the one between Fuji Bank, the Industrial Bank of Japan and Dai-Ichi Kangyo 
Bank in September 2000, to form a mega bank group called Mizuho Financial Group. This was followed 
by three other mega mergers involving its main competitors in April 2001. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, 
Mitsubishi Trust and Nippon Trust merged to form the Mitsubishi-Tokyo Financial Group. The second 
merger was between Sakura Bank and Sumitomo Bank which established the Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Corporation (SMBC). The third merger involved Sanwa Bank, Tokai Bank and Toyo Trust to set up the 
United Financial of Japan (UFJ) group. The most recent consolidation was in December 2001 when 
Daiwa Bank, Kinki Osaka Bank and Nara Bank merged. In March 2002, Asahi Bank joined them to form 
another financial group that was tentatively named Resona Holdings in October 2002; its main institution, 
Resona Bank, was rescued by the government in May 2003 (see section 3.2). Table 2 shows that, as of 
end-March 2003, the Mizuho Financial Group was the largest banking conglomerate in Japan with 
(consolidated) total assets of about Yen 131 trillion, deposits of Yen 67 trillion and loans of around Yen 70 
trillion. The second largest group was Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group with total assets amounting to 
Yen 101.5 trillion, followed by Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, UFJ Group and Resona Holdings. The 
strategies of these groups can be summarized as follows. Mizuho has been focusing on integrating more 
closely its three main predecessor banks (Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank, Fuji Bank and Industrial Bank of 
                                                  
9 In official publications, the major banks are often interpreted as the following 11 large banks: Mizuho Bank, Mizuho Corporate, 
Mizuho Trust, Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi Trust and Banking Co., UFJ Bank, UFJ Trust Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui 
 8Japan).
10 Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group and UFJ Group have been paying more attention to their 
retail business, with the latter having established 24-hour access to ATMs. Finally, Sumitomo Mitsui has 
the largest non-performing loan portfolio and consequently has been known to give high priority to solve 
that problem in particular [Megabanks Series NNS, September 2003].    
 
 
Table 1 Financial institutions in Japan in 1991 and 2002 




















City banks  12 31.1  376.6 7  23.9  363.1 7 
Long-term credit banks  3 1.4  76.6  3
1 1.0  53.1 2 
Trust banks  7 2.8  59.3  8 3.4  64.5  27
4 
Regional banks  64 19.5  187.9  64 18.8  205.7  64 
Second Tier regional banks  68 7.1  68.8  53 5.8  61.9  51 
Shinkin banks  451 10.3 96.0 349 10.7  112.1  326 
Credit co-operatives  407 2.8 24.1  247 1.6 18.3  191 
Labour co-operatives/banks  47 0.9 7.5 39 1.3  13.4  21 
Agricultural co-operatives  3,600 7.0  58.4  1,264 7.6  75.2 944 
Securities companies  272
3  27.0  290
3  19.4  280 
Life insurance companies  26   130.3  42   184.4  42 
Non-life insurance companies  24   26.2  35
2   33.5  24 
Postal life and annuity     51.8  24,778
2   124.8  
Postal savings   17.1   24,778
2 25.9     
Government institutions   11   92.9  11   159.4  9 
         
 
Sources: Van Rixtel et. al. (2003), except last column which is from Japanese Bankers Association (2003b). 
Note: Figures are as of the end of 1991, March 2002 and March 2003 (the end of the fiscal year). 
1. Long-term credit banks include the Industrial Bank of Japan, Shinsei Bank and Aozora Bank. 
2. The number is as of March 2001.  
3. These figures include 52 and 49 foreign securities companies as of March 1991 and March 2002 respectively. 
4. Of which 8 are full member of the Japanese Bankers Association. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Banking Corporation, Resona Bank, Chuo Mitsui Trust and Banking, and Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co. 
10 Kashyap (2002) describes some integration problems such as the failure of Mizuho’s computer systems on the first day of its 
operation. 
 9Table 2  Japanese financial groups in 2003 (on basis of consolidated accounts; end-March 2003) 
(in trillion of yen) 
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1.  Established by the merger between Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Fuji Bank and Industrial Bank of Japan. The name of the 
financial holding company is Mizuho Holdings Inc. 
2.  Established by the merger between Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank. 
3.  Established by the merger between Bank of Tokyo, Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi Trust & Banking and Nippon Trust & 
Banking. 
4.  Established by the merger between Sanwa Bank, Tokai Bank and Toyo Trust & Banking. 
5.  Established by the merger between Daiwa Bank and Asahi Bank. 
6.  Established by the merger between Chuo Trust & Banking and Mitsui Trust & Banking 
7.  Numbers in brackets are the percentage changes from the figures as of end-March 2002. 
 
Source: Fitch Ratings (2003), Van Rixtel et. al. (2003) and own calculations. 
 
 103.2 Current situation in the Japanese banking sector 
The most dominant problems in the Japanese banking sector are the continuing heavy burden of non-
performing loans, other asset problems and low capital adequacy ratios. These problems have been ongoing 
since the burst of the “Bubble” economy in the early nineties and, although a careful recovery may be 
observed recently, convinced the IMF to conclude in its Financial System Stability Assessment published in 
September 2003 that “… the financial system remains fragile, and that a more comprehensive and accelerated 
approach is required to restore the health of the financial system” [IMF (2003), p.1]. It is clear that the actions 
of Japanese banks in the context of these problems are strongly intertwined with their reaction to the 
development and implementation of the New Basel Capital Accord, and therefore attention to the specifics of 
the current problems in the Japanese banking industry will be paid here [see also: Nakaso (2001); Oyama and 
Shiratori (2001); Spiegel (2002); Bank of Japan (2003d) and (2003f); Fitch Ratings (2003); Goldman Sachs 
(2003b); Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2003); IMF (2003); ING Financial Markets (2003); JP Morgan Securities 
(2003b), (2003c) and (2003d); Nikko CitiGroup (2003b)]. Because of limitations of space, in many 
instances we will refer largely to the relevant literature regarding the banking problems in Japan. This is 
also done against the background of providing additional information on the impaired banking system in 
Japan, which in our view is important to be able to assess fully the possible impact of Basel II on 
Japanese banking. 
The problems in the Japanese banking sector become very clear when looking at the yearly growth 
rates of various balance sheet items of the seven large financial groups presented in Table 2. Basically all 
financial groups saw their total assets and loans fall from end-March 2000 to end-March 2003, and in 
particular their capital base (in terms of equity) was eroded significantly. In addition, five out of seven groups 
experienced a decrease in the total amount of deposits. Regarding securities’ holdings, as registered on their 
investment accounts, the picture is somewhat mixed, reflecting more bank-specific conditions and policies, as 
certain banks increased their positions (i.e. Sumitomo Mitsui, Mitsubishi Tokyo, UFJ and Resona), whereas 
the remaining banks, in particular Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., decreased their securities investments. 
Another indicator for the soundness of a bank is its rating of financial strength such as published by various 
rating agencies. Such ratings published by Moody’s have been in the case of Japanese banks between D – and 
E+, whereas for the banking systems of the G-7 countries the average ratings have been between A – and C+ 
[source: IMF (2003), p.14]. 
 
3.2.1 Problem of non-performing loans 
As is shown in Table 3, the absolute amount of non-performing loans for all banks as published by the 
Financial Services Agency (FSA) has been reduced significantly from Yen 43.2 trillion as of end-March 2002 
to Yen 35.3 trillion as of end-March 2003, a remarkable decline of almost 19% in one year. However, this 
figure is almost the same as the 2001 figure, thus indicating that basically the net increase or flow in bad 
 11loans that developed between March 2001 and 2002 has been eliminated, but that the high stock or level of 
bad loans reported two years ago still needs to be addressed.
11 Given this situation, Japanese banks will have 
to continue to take significant loan losses and make adequate provisions. Furthermore, Table 3 shows that the 
reduction in non-performing loans was heavily concentrated at the group of the major banks, and that bad 
loan disposal at regional banks basically did not reduce the stock of bad loans over the past three years. In 
addition, it should be kept in mind that the bad loan figures published by the FSA are not consolidated, and 
thus do not include non-performing loans on the books of banks’ affiliated institutions such as credit recovery 
companies. The number of these companies increased from 6 at end-2000 to 13 at end-2002, and the amount 
of related bad loans at these firms increased in parallel from Yen 1.5 trillion to Yen 10.3 trillion [Fukao (2003), 
p.88]. On the other hand, some positive signals have been observed, for example by the Bank of Japan. The 
Bank noted in its report on the results of Japanese banks for Fiscal Year 2002, which was released in August 
2003, that “… the level of non-performing loans removed by major banks was historically high, and the pace 
of removal was faster than that set by the government” [Bank of Japan (2003d), p.24]. Moreover, in October 
2003 is observed regarding Japanese banks that “… their lending attitudes seem to be becoming slightly more 
accommodative in areas such as terms and conditions for loans” and “… the lending attitudes of financial 
institutions as perceived by firms in general are improving somewhat, although those perceived by small 
firms remain severe” [Bank of Japan (2003f), p.16]. More optimistic views (and effectively somewhat 
downplaying the concerns raised by the IMF and certain academic circles in particular) are to find among 
private sector banking and financial analysts in Tokyo, most of whom have revised their expectations 
upwards.
12 This optimism is based on reported declines of new bad loans, increased loan work outs and high 
growth rates of loan sales in the course of 2003. On the one hand, this development highlights a tougher 
attitude on behalf of the FSA – in particular regarding the major banks – and increased purchases of bad loans 
by the Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC), on the other hand an increased willingness of banks to 
resolve their bad loan situation and re-pay public fund injections, partly in order to mitigate dependence on 
government support and the attached conditions of business restructuring and revitalization programs. The 
increased pressure of the FSA on banks under minister Takenaka, in combination with a change towards more 
independent auditing in Japan, have been emphasized as being the main factors behind the bail-out of Resona 
Bank in May 2003 [see Asian Wall Street Journal, 6 August 2003]. The collapse of Resona Bank was 
effectively initiated by its auditors, who could not accept the amount of deferred tax assets (DTAs) the bank 
had put on its accounts. As we will see later, these assets are a main part of Japanese banks’ Tier 1 capital, and 
thus the auditors’ rejection of Resona’s calculated amounts of claimed DTAs forced it into insolvency and de-
                                                  
11 The total amount of “non performing loans” in the Japanese financial was estimated at Yen 237 trillion by Goldman Sachs in 
2002 [see The Banker (2003a)]. 
12 According to figures published by Goldman Sachs, Japanese banks resolved more non-performing loans in the second half of 
fiscal year 2002 than in the full fiscal year 2001. For other (some somewhat more, others somewhat less) positive views, 
emphasizing that the resolution of Japan’s bad loan problems is entering its final phase, see for example: Fitch Ratings (2003a); 




Table 3 The status of non-performing loans for all banks according to the Financial Reconstruction 
Law
1 (end of period values; in Yen trillion) 
  Non-performing loans based on the Financial Reconstruction Law
1 
  As of March 2001  As of March 2002  As of March 2003 
City banks, long-term credit 
banks and trust banks
2 
20.0 28.4 20.7 
                Of which the major 11 
banks
2,3 
18.0 26.8 20.2 
Regional banks
4  13.6 14.8 14.7 
Total of all banks  33.6 43.2 35.3 
Co-operative financial 
institutions 
9.4 9.2 9.2 
Total of all deposit-taking 
financial institutions 
43.0 52.4 44.5 
1. Financial institutions that are declared bankruptcy are excluded; figures for “non-performing loans based on the Financial 
Reconstruction Law” are the sum of the assets classified as “bankrupt/de facto bankrupt”, “doubtful”, and “special attention”.  
2. Figures of non-performing loans for UFJ Bank include those transferred to UFJ Strategic Partner Co., Ltd. 
3. "Major 11 banks" stand for city banks, long-term credit banks and trust banks excluding Shinsei Bank and Aozora Bank. 
4. "Regional Banks" include Saitama Resona Bank. 




Over the past 10 years, many initiatives have been developed by the Japanese authorities in order to solve the 
bad loans problem.
14 The most recent steps include the following, some of which have been interpreted as a 
signal of a toughening regulatory policy stance regarding the banks [Japanese Bankers Association (2003b); 
IMF (2003)]. The FSA introduced in October 2002 the so-called “Financial Revitalization Program” (or 
“Takenaka Plan” named after the minister for financial services) which main objective was to half the bad 
loan ratio by fiscal year 2004.
15  This program paved the way for the establishment of the Industrial 
Revitalization Corporation of Japan (IRCJ) in May 2003. Its main aim is to provide assistance to revitalize 
“revivable” corporations by purchasing the loans made to these corporations. Furthermore, the program 
introduced a new inspection scheme, addressed provisioning by banks and introduced discounted cash flow 
(DCF) methodology, and, in order to develop better governance at Japanese banks, proposed the audit of 
                                                  
13 Resona’s collapse and subsequent bailout have been discussed extensively in for example Financial Times, 27 October 2003, 
Fitch Ratings (2003a), IMF (2003), JP Morgan (2003a), JP Morgan (2003b) and JP Morgan Securities (2003b). 
14 For an overview see Van Rixtel (2002), Chapter 6. 
15 For more specific details on this plan and the political dimensions see for example The Banker (2003a) and Credit Suisse First 
Boston (2002). 
 13capital levels by external experts from fiscal year 2003 onwards. The adoption of the DCF method by all 
major banks and some regional and Second Tier regional banks in fiscal year 2002 has been strongly 
welcomed by the BoJ as a positive step “… to build a framework for more appropriate evaluation of loans” 
[Bank of Japan (2003d), p.23]. In the course of 2003, the FSA conducted so-called “special inspections” 
which resulted in specific actions being taken by individual banks such as accelerating their bad-loan disposal 
[see for example CSFB, (2003b)]. In April of the same year, the FSA announced measures for increased 
governance at banks receiving public support and set new guidelines for the conversion of preferred stocks 
[CSFB (2003a)]. In September 2003, the FSA announced to expand its budget for injections of public money 
into undercapitalized banks by Yen 2 trillion [NNS, 11 September 2003]. 
  Based on the results form the special inspections and subsequent regulatory instructions, banks, 
which had received public funds in the past, disclosed their revised financial revitalization plans in September 
2003 which set targets for profitability, capital adequacy ratios and restructuring until fiscal year 2006  [CSFB 
(2003c); Morgan Stanley (2003c); FSA (2003b)]. Subsequently, 626 regional banks and credit associations 
submitted business improvement plans to the FSA in October as well. Regarding developments at individual 
major banks,
16 Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Co., which has the largest bad debt burden of the major banks, 
announced in October 2003 to sell Yen 1 trillion of non-performing loans to an investment fund established 
by Goldman Sachs and other firms. UFJ Bank formed a joint venture with Merrill Lynch for the same 
purpose. The Bank of Tokyo – Mitsubishi reported that it had halved its bad-loan ratio to 4% at the end of 
September 2003, a year and a half earlier than the end-March 2005 target date set by the government under its 
financial revitalization program. The bank had announced in February its intention to raise capital through a 
public share offering, the first one of a Japanese bank in 13 years [The Economist (2003)]. Sumitomo Trust 
and Banking has made it clear to hope to be the second large bank to meet this target, and announced its 
intention to repay fast the Yen 200 billion capital injection which it received from the government in 1999. 
One of the two remaining long-term credit banks, Aozora Bank, announced its intention to sell Yen 400 
billion in bad loans to the government over three years. The major banks in particular seem to speed-up the 
disposal of bad loans and the return of (not cost free) government capital injections in order to avoid higher 
interest rate payments and government interference with their business, and many of them have established 
specialized companies or units to dispose of bad loans.  
 
3.2.2 Other asset problems 
Another asset problem of Japanese banks has been their significant exposure to price developments in capital 
markets, in particular to stock and bond prices, resulting from their substantial holdings of both types of 
securities. Based on the figures presented in Table 2, it can be calculated that securities holdings (investment 
account) as a percentage of total assets at end-March 2003 for the four largest financial groups – Mizuho, 
 14Sumitomo Mitsui, Mitsubishi Tokyo and UFJ – were 18.3%, 23.7%, 25.7% and 23.2% respectively. 
According to Table 4, as of end-March 2003, the total amount of stock-holdings of major Japanese banks was 
Yen 18.4 trillion, and their total combined bond portfolios amounted to Yen 62.2 trillion. Compared with end-
March 2002, stock-holdings were down by 35% and bond-holdings up by almost 20%. A similar 
development, although less pronounced, can be observed for the regional and Second Tier regional banks. 
Their stock and bond portfolios were Yen 4.8 trillion and Yen 46.0 trillion, down 20% and up 7% respectively 
[see Table 5]. As the risk-weights for stocks are higher than for bonds, the reduction in stock-holdings and 
increase in bond-holdings during FY2002 significantly lowered the total amount of risk-weighted assets of 
Japanese banks, as is shown in Chart 1.  
Due to the adoption of mark-to-market accounting, price changes affecting the valuation of stock and 
bond portfolios directly affect the banks’ capital position [Van Rixtel (2002)]. Evidently, this is particularly a 
problem when stock prices fall and long-term interest rates rise at the same time. And, of course, even when 
interest rates fall, the gains on bond portfolios may be insufficient to compensate for stock losses. For 
example, during FY 2002, the net realized stock-related losses of Japanese banks totaled Yen 3.9 trillion yen, 
whereas net realized bond-related gains due to lower long-term interest rates amounted to Yen 0.8 trillion, a 
net difference in losses of almost Yen 3 trillion [see Bank of Japan (2003d), pp.16-17]. Furthermore, the 
amount of unrealized capital gains on securities holdings is important as well, for example given their 
relationship to Tier 1 and 2 capital (see section 4).  
 
Table 4 Assets of major banks 
 
  FY 1998  FY 1999  FY 2000  FY 2001  FY 2002 






















































   
Source: Bank of Japan (2003d) 
Note: Other bonds include local government bonds and corporate bonds. Figures in brackets are annual percentage changes.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
16 Based on various reports obtained through the Nikkei Net System (NNS).  
 15Table 5 Assets of Regional banks and Second Tier Regional banks 
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Source: Bank of Japan (2003d) 
Note: Other bonds include local government bonds and corporate bonds. Figures in brackets are annual percentage changes.  
 
 
Chart 1  
 
Source: Bank of Japan (2003d) 
 
Regarding the exposure of Japanese banks to developments in the stock market, it has become official 
government policy to reduce the amount of stock holdings by banks. This mainly for two reasons: firstly, to 
reduce the effects of stock price fluctuations on banks’ capital positions and, secondly, to unwind the 
extensive cross-shareholdings between banks and non-financial corporations that characterized for so long 
the Japanese economic system.
17 In order to achieve these goals, the following policy measures have been 
taken [among others: IMF (2003); Japanese Bankers Association (2003b)]. First, parliament passed a law in 
November 2001 that restricted stock holdings of banks to no more than their respective Tier 1 capital as of 
                                                  
17 See Baba et. al. (2002) for data regarding the unwinding of cross-shareholdings in the Japanese economy. The importance of these 
holdings has been reduced substantially since the early nineties. JP Morgan (2003c) reported that the unwinding of cross-shareholding 
 16end-September 2004, with a maximum grace period of two years. Second, under the same law, the 
government established in January 2002 the Banks’ Shareholdings Purchase Corporation which main 
function was to assist banks in meeting the stock holdings restriction in time by buying their shares. The Law 
was amended in July 2003 to make it easier for banks to sell stocks to the Corporation by easing conditions, 
such as abolishing an 8% contribution (fee) requirement for banks to the stock purchases. These conditions 
attached to the Corporation’s operations had made the scheme not very successful. Third, the Bank of Japan 
started its own stock purchasing scheme in November 2002, by acquiring stocks from banks with stock 
portfolios in excess of their Tier 1 capital (see Chart 2). In September 2003, the Bank announced the 
extension of its program by one year. As a result of the two share-purchasing programs, the major Japanese 
banks managed to reduce their stock holdings from Yen 28.4 trillion at end-March 2002 to Yen 18.4 trillion at 
end-March 2003 (see also Table 4). The major banks are also reducing their cross-shareholdings with regional 
banks, which could have strategic implications for the structure of the Japanese banking system. Chart 3 
shows that banks had almost met the target of lowering their stock holdings to the amount of Tier I capital 
already at the end of fiscal year 2002 (end-March 2003). However, it has to be acknowledged, following the 
IMF, that this target “… is still an unusually large exposure for a bank to have to the equity market” [IMF 
(2003), p.18].  
 
Chart 2 Stock purchasing scheme of the Bank of Japan 





























Source: Bank of Japan 
                                                                                                                                                                  
had past its peak.  
 17Chart 3 
 
Source: Bank of Japan (2003d)  
 
The reduction in Japanese banks’ exposure to the stock market that has been achieved, however, has not 
been effectuated for the bond market as well. As has been reported above, bond holdings by Japanese 
banks have been steadily increasing over the past years (see Tables 4 and 5). Thus, Japanese banks, in 
particular the major banks, have experienced a significant increase in their interest rate risk exposure. A 
positive factor in this respect has been the relatively low average duration of Japanese banks’ bond 
portfolios, which has been estimated by various investment banks between 3.5 and 4 years [Goldman 
Sachs (2003c); interview ING Financial Markets, October 2003]. Table 6 shows that the duration of the 
total bond portfolio as estimated by Goldman Sachs was the highest for Mitsui Trust Holdings with 6.4 
years, and the lowest for Resona Holdings with 2.7 years. The average duration of the bond portfolios of 







 18Table 6 Estimated duration of bond portfolios of major Japanese banks (as of end-March 2003; 













Group  3.7 6.1  3.5  5.5  4.3 
Sumitomo Mitsui 
Financial Group  3.4 5.4  3.5  5.4  3.9 
Mitsubishi Tokyo 
Financial Group  3.3 3.4  2.4  4.9  3.9 
UFJ Holdings  3.4 6.3  3.9  4.7  3.8 
Sub-total  3.5 4.9  3.3  5.1  4 
Resona Holdings  2.6 5.3  2.3  2.8  2.7 
Sumitomo Trust 
& Banking  1.7 5  3.4  6  4.5 
Mitsui Trust 
Holdings  6.3 4  3.1  7.6  6.4 
Mizuho Trust & 
Banking  3.6 5.4  2.9  3.7  3.7 
Sub-total  3.6 5.1  2.7  5.6  4 
Total  3.5 4.9  3.2  5.2  4 
Source: Goldman Sachs (2003c) 
 
 
Thus, the price sensitivity of bond portfolios of Japanese banks to interest rate movements can be 
interpreted as relatively low, and thus developments in bond markets will have relatively modest 
valuation effects in terms of unrealized and realized profits and losses. Although this is true, it has been 
reported by Standard & Poor’s that Japanese banks have increased longer-term maturity bonds in their 
portfolios in order to achieve small improvements in their interest rate margins, given the very low levels 
of interest rates [Standard & Poor’s (2003b)]. Thus, even if the duration of these portfolios has been low, 
it may have increased over the past two years compared to historic levels. On the other hand, it has to be 
acknowledged that bond market dynamics can change rapidly: for example, during April and May 2003, 
large banks were net sellers of long-term bonds and net buyers of short-term paper, effectively reducing 
the duration of their portfolios [JP Morgan Securities (2003a)].
18  As the experience of these months 
showed, the combination of high bond market volatility and high bond-holdings can lead to significant 
increases in risk-levels for Japanese banks, and endanger their capital position, forcing them to reduce 
their bond-holdings rapidly which may result in higher market volatility and interest rates.  
  The large combined stock and bond holdings of the major Japanese banks have resulted in significant 
equity and interest rate exposures. Stress testing in the context of the IMF’s Financial System Stability 
Assessment showed that the Japanese banking system is quite sensitive to a combination of specific market 
developments. The IMF concluded that “… measured by the loss-bearing capacity of shareholders’ equity, 
                                                  
18 During the same period, regional banks and Second Tier regional banks were net buyers of long-term bonds, thus increasing 
their duration. Thus, between the various sectors of the banking system the degree of interest rate risk exposure may differ 
 19the Japanese banking system is undercapitalized relative to the interest rate, equity price, and credit risks in 
the system” [IMF (2003), p.19]. 
  
3.2.3 Weak capital base but stable solvency ratios 
The burden of non-performing loans and the related loan losses and provisions, and losses on securities’ 
holdings, in particular stock holdings, have eroded the capital base of Japanese banks [see for example: Hoshi 
(2001); Kashyap (2002); Van Rixtel (2002); Fitch Ratings (2003a); Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2003); IMF 
(2003)]. As is shown in Table 7, the capital levels of internationally active Japanese banks – i.e. the major 
Japanese banks – decreased from around Yen 47 trillion at the end of March 1999 (FY 1998) to almost Yen 
25 trillion at the end of March 2003 (FY 2002), a decline of 47%. However, since their risk-weighted assets 
decreased by 45% during the same period, their risk-weighted capital adequacy ratios maintained relatively 
stable and significantly above 8%. The reverse situation can be observed at the smaller, i.e. not internationally 
active banks, which experienced a steady increase of both regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets. In 
terms of risk-weighted assets, the 26% decrease for the major (internationally active) banks in FY2002 and 
the 21% increase for the smaller (i.e. non-internationally active) banks in the same year is remarkable.  
 
Table 7 Risk based capital adequacy ratio – all banks 
  FY 1998  FY 1999  FY 2000  FY 2001  FY 2002 
Capital adequacy ratios (consolidated risk-
based) of internationally active banks  11.02% 11.79% 11.05% 10.63% 10.50% 


























Consolidated risk-based capital adequacy ratio 
of banks not active internationally  6.70% 8.38% 9.57% 9.44% 8.52% 
























Source: Bank of Japan (2003d) 
Note: For each period, figures for internally active banks and banks not active internationally at the time of the survey are 
compiled separately on a consolidated basis. Figures in brackets are annual percentage changes. 
 
 
An issue that received considerable attention has been was the importance of deferred tax assets (DTA’s) in 
Japanese banks’ Tier 1 capital [see for example: ING Financial Markets (2002); FSA (2003a); Fitch Ratings 
                                                                                                                                                                  
significantly, which would seem to offer possibilities of risk-sharing mechanisms.  
 20(2003a); Goldman Sachs (2003a); Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2003); IMF (2003); Risk (2003a); Standard & 
Poor’s (2003a)]. This was not the least because of their role in the fall and subsequent bailout of Resona 
Bank and the widespread believe that if Resona’s auditors’ criteria would be applied to other major banks, 
most of them would instantaneously turn out to be undercapitalized or even insolvent. This because at the 





Source: Bank of Japan (2003d) 
 
DTA’s are basically tax credits against loan-loss provisions made for non-performing loans, and are based on 
the future reductions in taxes that banks will receive when the doubtful borrower will actually default. Thus 
the realization of DTA’s depends on two crucial assumptions: first, banks must generate taxable income in the 
future – i.e. they must generate sufficient profits and thus have sufficiently high earnings projections – and 
second, the bad loans for which provisions have been made must actually go bad and become irrecoverable. 
Another structural weakness of DTA’s as bank capital is their sensitivity to stock market developments. As 
has been reported in Goldman Sachs (2003a), just like unrealized losses on stock holdings result in deferred 
tax assets, unrealized gains on stock-holdings create deferred tax liabilities. In other words, rising stock-
market prizes lead to lower net DTA’s, and thus erode DTA’s in the capital base of Japanese banks. In Japan, 
the government changed the accounting rules in March 2000 to allow banks to register DTA’s on their 
accounts and to include them in their Tier 1 capital. Thus, as stated by Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2003), p.323, 
 21“… as of March 2000, the banks’ capital had increased quite abruptly due to this accounting reform”. Given 
the high uncertainty surrounding the economic value of DTA’s, their effective use as bank capital has been 
questioned severely. In certain countries, such as Hong Kong and Korea, banks are not allowed to include 
DTA’s in their capital at all [Standard & Poor’s (2003a), p.1]. In the United States, the use of DTA’s in bank 
capital is restricted to the lower amount of 10% of Tier 1 capital or one year’s profits [IMF (2003)]. Under the 
guidelines of the Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants , the amount of DTA’s that can be used as 
Tier 1 capital is limited to expected profits over the next five years, and the extent to which they are actually 
used must be approved by the banks’ auditors. The Institute also requests in its guidelines that deferred tax 
assets be estimated with caution, thus giving considerable discretion to auditors in estimating a bank’s capital, 
and consequently raising the uncertainty about the amount of Tier 1 capital in the Japanese banking system. 
In reaction to the DTA discussion, the FSA has required that banks disclose the specific profit assumptions on 
which their DTA calculations are based. This was based on the conclusions of the Working Group on 
Regulation of Capital Adequacy Ratio, which focused on the use of DTA’s as bank capital in particular and 
published its findings in July 2003. Its most important conclusion was the “… broad agreement over the 
recognition that the ratio of deferred tax assets against capital should be reduced in the future” [FSA (2003a)].   
 
4. Lessons from the past: Basel I and Japanese banks 
The original Basel Capital Accord has been discussed extensively in Japan and some observers saw it as a 
conspiracy of certain Western banks in order to halt the international expansion of the relatively 
undercapitalized Japanese banks [see for example: editorial Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 9 June 2003]. According 
to the Accord, internationally operating banks would have to meet a capital to weighted assets ratio of 
eight percent by the end of 1992. The Japanese Ministry of Finance interpreted this date as the end of 
Fiscal Year 1992 (i.e. the end of March 1993), and that it would be applied to internationally operating 
banks only [see M.J.B. Hall (1992) and (1993)].
19 For domestic banks, i.e. banks with no international 
offices, the 8% requirement was later lowered by the MoF to only 4%. In the case of Japan, up to 45% of 
banks’ latent gains on securities holdings were allowed to be counted as Tier 2 capital. According to the 
Anti-Monopoly Law, Japanese banks could hold up to 5% of the equity of a single firm. Given the rise in 
share prices during the so-called “Bubble” period, these cross-shareholdings embodied substantial reval-
uation reserves, and consequently the unrealized gains on these securities holdings were included in Tier 
II capital [Frankel and Morgan (1992), p.588]. Since banks had acquired the stocks of corporations a long 
                                                  
19 The IMF has stated that all Japanese banks should be subject to the 8% requirement. The claim of Japanese authorities that the 
Basel Capital Accord applies to internationally active banks only is refuted by the Fund, as it states that this terminology is not 
defined in the Accord. See IMF (2003), p.23. Furthermore, the IMF argues that the practice of including provisions made for 
certain doubtful loans (loans that “need attention” and “need special attention”) in Tier 2 capital is not in line with the 
Basel Capital Accord. 
 22time ago as part of maintaining long-term business relationships, unrealized capital gains were “hidden” 
from the balance sheet in accordance with Japanese accounting standards. However, the burst of the 
“Bubble” in the early nineties and the sharp drop in stock prices eroded this part of Japanese banks’ Tier 
II capital rapidly, raising concerns among Japanese and international supervisory authorities. The slump 
in the Japanese equity market caused equity portfolios increasingly to become a factor of instability for 
the banks’ financial health. From 1991 to 1992, the revaluation reserves were halved, resulting in a 
significant worsening of the solvency position of the Japanese banking sector. In addition, the drop in 
stock prices made it virtually impossible for Japanese banks to issue new equity (as a matter of fact, not a 
single Japanese bank has issued new stocks for the past 12 years). Furthermore, the stock market’s slide 
led to soaring unrealized losses on the banks’ balance sheets, which have to be deducted fully (100%) 
from Tier 1 capital. Japanese banks reacted by issuing substantial amounts of subordinated debt that 
counted as Tier 2 capital, and which were largely absorbed by connected Japanese insurance companies 
[Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2003); see also Pettway et. al. (1991)]. As we will see later, this process started 
to exacerbate “double gearing” problems, as banks and insurance companies increasingly provided each 
other with capital. 
Regarding existing research on the effects of Basel I on Japanese banking, Ito and Sasaki (2002) 
concluded that the Accord had a significant impact on Japanese banking behavior, because as stock prices 
decreased, banks with low capital ratios decreased the provision of loans as well. As a result, the market 
for subordinated debt became increasingly important. Montgomery (2001) argued that the stricter capital 
adequacy requirements that were introduced caused a contraction in loan growth in the Japanese economy. 
Using a panel of Japanese banks balance sheets for the fiscal years 1992 to 1999, this study found that the 
minimum capital requirement of 8% increased the sensitivity of total loan growth to capitalization for 
international banks operating in Japan. However, this effect was not found for the domestically operating 
banks that had to comply with the 4% capital adequacy requirement. Horiuchi and Shimizu (1998) 
rejected the capital crunch hypothesis for Japanese banks, as they claimed that the issuance of 
subordinated debt compensated for declines in capital, helped by the existence of long-term relationships 
inherent to the structure of Japanese banking and economy. Investigating the stock market effects of the 
adoption of risk-based capital requirements on international banks in different countries, Cooper et. al. 
(1991) found mixed evidence – based on actual developments in banks’ stock prices – regarding the 
perceived effect by financial markets of Basel I on Japanese banks. This result was explained by 
uncertainty that may have existed among investors regarding the treatment of hidden reserves, and by 
substantial differences of opinion between market experts on the impact of the Capital Accord on 
Japanese banks.   
  Finally, against the background of the banking crisis in Japan over the past 10 years – a period 
when Basel I was effectively in place – some have questioned the effectiveness of the Basel framework 
 23for countries that have banking systems characterized by the existence of long-term relationships. 
Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2003) claim that accounting indicators such as capital adequacy requirements are 
not that useful in relationship banking systems, because information asymmetries between insiders and 
outsiders make it for the insiders (i.e. the banks) relatively easy to disguise actual bad loan problems, thus 
bank loans become “opaque” and stated capital levels are in fact relatively meaningless. They point at the 
fact that the three major banks that collapsed at the height of the Japanese banking crisis – Hokkaido-
Takushoku Bank, Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and Nippon Credit Bank – had published capital ratios 
well above 8% just prior to their collapse (9.3%, 10.4% and 8.2% respectively). The same pattern can be 
observed in the case of Resona Bank, which, as we have seen, was rescued by the Japanese government in 
May 2003. As a matter of fact, it has been argued by many that the existence of various types of long-term 
relationships in the Japanese economic system, such as relationship banking (“Main Bank” system) and 
the large informally organized industrial conglomerates (“Keiretsu”), made it relatively easy for Japanese 
banks to hide bad loans in various affiliated companies and promote non-transparency to the maximum 
extent possible [see Van Rixtel (2002)]. In this respect, it should be noted that non-transparency and non-
disclose has characterized for many years the banking system and supervisory behavior in Japan, which, 
at times, reinforced skepticism about the true value of official reported figures of bank health and 
performance.
20 Again, this pattern can be observed in the case of Resona Bank’s failure, as media reports 
have started to emerge that its actual problems are much larger than previously assumed [see for example 
Financial Times, 11/12 October 2003 and 27 October 2003].  
 
5. The formal reaction of Japanese banks to the New Basel Capital Accord 
A large number of organizations, including individual banks, banking associations as well as rating 
agencies from major countries, have expressed publicly the view that the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision’s new proposals are very restrictive. In this section, a summarized overview of the major 
issues that have been raised by the Japanese banking industry and their representative bodies is presented. 
No attention will be paid to the specific comments on the proposed treatment of securitization under the 
New Capital Accord, which will be discussed in subsection 6.2.1. The official reactions of these 
organizations to the Basel Committee’s various consultative papers are listed on their respective 
homepages and the homepage of the Committee itself. Japanese institutions that provided comments over 
the past few years have been the following: Japanese Bankers Association, the Regional Banks 
Association of Japan, The Second Association of Regional Banks, the National Association of Shinkin 
Banks, the Shinkin Central Bank, the Norinchukin Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation and the 
                                                  
20 See in this respect also the problems the IMF faced in conducting stress tests for its Financial System Stability Assessment of 
Japan in 2003 [Financial Times, 24 October 2003]. 
 24Japan Center for International Finance [see list of references for specific documents]. In the overview 
presented here, the focus will be on their responses to the Committee’s Third Consultative Paper (CP3). 
Regarding the comments on Pillar 1, one common opinion expressed has been that the new 
framework of the internal rating-based (IRB) approach should be simplified, so that banks can implement 
the regulatory requirements more efficiently. The Norinchukin Bank expressed that the requirements 
should be translated into more flexible schemes that can be used to evaluate risk measures taken within 
the actual operation of banks’ internal rating methodologies. The bank mentioned stress testing as one 
specific effective tool to deal with pro-cyclicality concerns. The Japanese Bankers Association argued in 
favor of simplifying the credit-risk framework and adopting a more flexible interpretation that takes into 
account the actual (high) costs of developing computer systems and altering operational procedures. More 
in general, it has been highlighted that banks have to manage considerable swings in capital requirements 
due to business cycle developments and will face increased volatility in their capital charges because of 
certain restrictions which the New Accord imposes upon the use of capital management tools. Thus, the 
general pro-cyclicality criticism that Basel II does not smooth cyclical effects regarding capital 
requirements is supported [Financial Times, 12 September 2003; The Banker, 1 October 2003]. 
Furthermore, Japanese banks expressed concerns regarding the significant burden imposed by transitional 
measures and the requirements regarding the stipulations for estimating loan given default (LGD) and 
exposure at default (EAD) under Pillar 1. The minimum holding periods of seven years for both LGD and 
EAD related data and five years for probability of default (PD) data have been claimed to be excessively 
long, particularly at the beginning of the implementation of the New Accord. 
As regards Pillar 2 of Basel II, Japanese banks argued that the supervisory review process 
imposes a significant burden on bank capital requirements. In addition, the inclusion of the second pillar, 
as emphasized by Norinchukin Bank, may lead to an increase in overall regulatory capital needs. It is 
feared that after the proposed measures under Pillar 2 have been implemented, the authorities may raise 
capital requirements, which could even contradict or invalid calculations of capital needs made under 
Pillar 1.  
In addition, Japanese banks and their organizations stressed the need for further simplification of 
Pillar 3. They acknowledged that the scope of the third Pillar has been considerably narrowed in CP3 in 
comparison with the Second Consultative paper (CP2). However, it is argued that some disclosure 
requirements continue to be defined vaguely, which constitute important legal and operational 
uncertainties for the banks involved. Regarding Pillar 3, further simplification, including taking into 
account the work in this respect of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), is proposed.  
Finally, Japanese banks have been protesting against the capital requirements stemming from the 
explicit inclusion in Basel II of operational risk. This basically because of their alleged better functioning 
back-offices and superior qualifications of their staff. For example, Risk (2001c) quotes Mr. S. Masunaga 
 25of Chuo Aoyama Audit Corporation as follows: “Banks in Japan think that the [capital] charge is too high 
and that they have a lower exposure to operational risk compared with banks in the US and elsewhere 
because of the quality of their personnel”.  
 
6. The tactical and strategic implications of the New Basel Capital Accord for 
Japanese banking 
This section investigates the likely impact of the development and implementation of the New Basel 
Capital Accord on Japanese banks’ business practices and the structure of the Japanese banking system. 
The main source of information for this analysis is formed by the series of 21 interviews conducted 
during the period September – November 2003, augmented by information from academic and policy-
institutions’ research, industry reports and media sources.  
  The analysis distinguishes between so-called tactical and strategic implications of Basel II on 
Japanese banking. Tactical implications relate to the day-to-day business operations of Japanese banks 
and how their operational framework may be affected (micro dimension). The investigation has generated 
as possible main tactical consequences of the new Capital Accord the adoption of a new business model 
based on risk management tools, the erosion of the “Main Bank” system and relationship banking, the re-
orientation of retail and wholesale banking activities, the acceleration of the disposal of bad loans, the 
negative impact on the competitiveness of Japanese banks in derivatives business and a possible positive 
impact stemming from the use of ratings published by Japanese rating organizations. Strategic 
implications focus on the structure of the banking system as such, the development of financial markets 
and services, and the overall functioning of the economy (macro dimension). The analysis concludes that 
Basel II – in its current form – could hamper the development of securitization in Japan, will be a catalyst 
for the development of the Japanese syndicated loan market, will also function as a catalyst for the further 
development and use of risk-transfer instruments, could put pressure on smaller financial institutions in 
the segmented Japanese banking system, might be a catalyst for the emergence of more market-based 
credit markets and could have macro-economic consequences that might have profound consequences for 
the Japanese banking system. All in all, most interviewees expected that Basel II predominantly will 
function as an important catalyst and that its main impact will not be so much felt in the short run (1-2 
years), due to the priority of tackling the bad loan and undercapitalization problems first, but much more, 
and significantly so, in the medium run (3-4 years, i.e. just before and around implementation of the New 
Accord) and the long run (after implementation). 
  It is clear that this analysis is surrounded by a significant degree of uncertainty. First, the definite 
and steady-state form of the New Basel Capital Accord is – as of November 2003 – not clear yet. Industry 
reactions to CP3 have been quite numerous and often critical in substance and thus may lead to more or 
 26less important changes of the Accord. Second, Basel II allows for a considerable degree of national 
discretion in defining and applying specific elements of the Accord, and it is not certain yet how Japanese 
supervisory authorities will use this discretion. Three, it is also not fully clear yet which specific option 
for assessing credit risk under the New Accord – i.e. the standardized approach or one of the two internal 
ratings-based (IRB) models  - Japanese banks will adopt. Most likely, as expected by market analysts, 
several major banks will opt for the advanced IRB option, but the majority of Japanese banks will follow 
the standardized approach. 
  Regarding the overall impact of the New Basel Capital Accord on Japanese banking, according to 
the summarized testing results of the 66 Japanese banks participating in QIS3 which have been published 
by the Financial Services Agency (FSA) and Bank of Japan (BoJ), it is not to be expected that the Accord 
will affect significantly the capital adequacy levels of Japanese banks [see Bank of Japan (2003c) and 
(2003d)]. The results show that under the standardized approach the risk weighted assets of these 66 
banks will likely be reduced by 2% and their capital adequacy ratio will improve by around 0.1% [see: 
Bank of Japan (2003i)]. This basically because of the mutually offsetting effects of on the one hand 
higher capital requirements for non-performing loans and on the other hand lower capital charges for 
retail activities (i.e. for consumer loans, mortgages and loans to small and medium-sized enterprises). 
Furthermore, capital charges stemming from operational risk requirements will be relatively modest for 
Japanese banks, given their low net operating revenues. These effects estimated by the supervisory 
authorities are supported by private sector research. Estimates of Morgan Stanley show that for the four 
large financial groups (Mizuho, MTFG, SMFG and UFJ), risk-weighted assets could decrease between 
0.5% and 2.2%, and capital adequacy ratios may improve between 0% and 0.2%.
21 For five large regional 
banks (Chiba, Fukuoka, Shizuoka, Suruga and Yokohama) the impact could be larger: risk-weighted 
assets may decrease between 1.8% and 8.4%, and capital ratios could improve between 0.2% and 0.9%. 
So, all in all, these projections show that the direct overall impact of Basel II on risk-weighted assets and 
(risk-based) capital adequacy ratios of particularly the largest banks may be relatively modest. 
 
6.1 Tactical implications 
6.1.1 Adoption of a new business model 
The possible impact of the New Basel Capital Accord on Japanese banking that was mentioned the most 
frequently by interviewees was that it would function as a very important catalyst for the further 
introduction of a new business model. This model would be in line with more sophisticated market-
conform and incentive compatible business models based on risk-return considerations and incorporating 
state-of-the-art risk management tools. In this sense, the Accord will function as a catalyst for further 
                                                  
21 Preliminary results provided by Mr. Hideyasu Ban, Equity Research Japan (Banks), Morgan Stanley, October 2003.  
 27reform of day-to-day business operations, particular in the sense of greater emphasis on risk-management 
considerations, in addition to the guidance from the FSA and BoJ and pressure from financial markets. In 
the past, specialized credit officers often looked at one specific risk only, but, partly due to Basel II, this is 
changing now, and a much more integrated approach of the various risks is followed. Thus, the New 
Accord will accelerate risk management on a consolidated basis. Japanese banks have often been 
criticized for not paying sufficiently high attention to risk-management aspects, but several interviewees 
were strongly convinced that this will fundamentally change under the looming introduction of the new 
Capital Accord. It is clear that under Basel II, banks that will have the most advanced capital and risk-
management tools and modeling capabilities will be among the winners, as they will be able to use the 
advanced IRB approach. However, some interviewees stressed that the large banks in Japan, which are 
the most likely candidates to adopt the advanced approach, are facing considerable data-problems, 
particular regarding loss given default (LGD) that is difficult to estimate under Japanese bankruptcy 
proceedings. Furthermore, under relationship banking and the “main bank” system (see next subsection), 
also the probability of default (PD) may be difficult to estimate. This could frustrate the adoption of the 
advanced approach by the major Japanese banks. Nevertheless, several other interviewees were convinced 
that the four large financial groups would finally adopt the advanced IRB model, given international 
competitive pressures.
22 
Information on the specific preparations of Japanese banks in their business models for the 
introduction of the New Accord is relatively scarce and hard to specify. Some interviewees stated that 
most major Japanese banks have started to hire significant numbers of external, often foreign, consultants 
to develop risk-management systems, and are spending considerable amounts of resources on this. Others 
were more skeptical in this respect and pointed at the, in their view, generally relatively worrying state of 
computer and database systems at Japanese banks.
23 Regarding specific preparations, it was reported in 
January 2003 that the UFJ Group intended to introduce a leading edge internal rating system in order to 
benefit from the specific credit risk approaches proposed under Basel II [NNS, 23 January 2003]. With 
respect to other preparatory actions, some interviewees pointed at investigations currently undertaken by 
various large financial groups on which specific amount of capital could be saved by further 
consolidations of business activities of the various groups’ subsidiaries. Regarding the operational risk 
requirements under the new Accord, interviewees stressed that these have become a major consideration 
for most Japanese banks only during the past few years, mainly because of the development of the Basel 
II framework.   
  Regarding day-to-day business, some interviewees expressed the view that Japanese banks may 
be forced to allow for greater autonomy in credit decisions of local branches, and thus adopt a more 
                                                  
22 One interviewee believed that only one financial group would choose the advanced approach, and expressed serious doubts if 
the three others would be ready in time. 
 28decentralized decision-making framework, due to greater emphasis on risk-return considerations . 
 
6.1.2 Expected erosion of the “Main Bank” system 
A clear majority of interviewees expressed their conviction that the introduction of the New Basel Capital 
Accord will lead to a gradual erosion of the “Main Bank” system in Japan. Under this informally 
organized system, Japanese banks have been operating as monitors – also on behalf of other lenders – of 
large numbers of commercial firms. Even firms that do not belong to one of the large industrial groups that 
dominate the Japanese economy (Keiretsu) normally maintain an informally based relationship with a (large) 
commercial bank [see Aoki et. al. (1994)]. In other words, following the terminology of Diamond (1984), the 
“Main Bank” system functions as a delegated monitor for the Japanese capital market as a whole. It bas been 
claimed that this function is especially relevant when borrowers are in situations of severe financial distress 
[Sheard (1994), p.86], although more recently the specific importance of the “Main Bank” system has been 
disputed [see Miwa and Ramseyer (2001)]. Basically, the system can be interpreted as a more extreme 
version of relationship banking [see Boot and Thakor (2000); Risk (2001d)]. Kobayashi et. al. (2002) 
documented very clearly that so-called “forbearance lending” took place in Japan after the collapse of the 
“Bubble” economy, under which banks were very reluctant to write off bad loans as they were concerned 
about the possible negative effects on long-term customer relationships, even when there was little prospect 
that the loans could still be recovered. Brewer III et. al. (2003) showed that (long-term) banking relationships 
in Japan have apparently been so important that the failure of several banks at the height of the banking crisis 
not only affected their client firms but the rest of the Japanese economy as well. However, a number of 
interviewees highlighted that under the “Main Bank” system, maintaining long-term relationships with 
borrowers – apparently sometimes at high costs – resulted often in inefficient and basically economically 
unsound lending decisions from the perspective of risk-return considerations. Therefore, this custom will 
most likely, slowly but steadily, become less significant as a result of Basel II, in combination with other 
factors such as the decreasing importance of cross-shareholdings in the Japanese economy in general and 
the reduction of stock-holdings by the major banks in particular, and the advance of new lending models 
in the Japanese banking industry (for the latter see subsection 6.2.5). The decreasing emphasis on long-
term relationships could also reduce the practice of “double gearing” involving mutual capital stakes 
between banks and (life) insurance companies, effectively hampering the possibility of banks to issue 
subordinated bonds which count as Tier 2 capital. 
  The likely impact of the New Basel Capital Accord on “Main Bank” relationships and 
relationship banking involves also important political economy aspects. In a paper published on its 
website in March 2003, the FSA strongly emphasized the need to maintain long-term banking 
relationships for smaller banks with respect to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME’s).  On the one 
                                                                                                                                                                  
23 For both views see also Risk (2001d). 
 29hand, this would be a relatively cheap way for the banks involved to obtain important credit-related 
information that would facilitate estimating credit risk in the more risk-based credit decision-making 
framework under Basel II. On the other hand, several market analysts argued that it would mitigate 
political concerns that SME’s would be squeezed, in particular when the new Accord would be 
implemented. 
 
6.1.3 Greater emphasis on retail banking 
Not surprisingly, several interviewees expressed the view that the development and introduction of Basel 
II will increase the focus on retail banking, given the relatively favorable treatment of this activity under 
the New Accord. This could lead to a substantial increase in the level of competition in the Japanese 
banking sector, not only between individual banks, but in particular between the various banking 
segments as well. As has been discussed in section 3, still considerable degrees of specialization in 
Japanese banking exist between various sectors. Some interviewees were convinced that when the bad 
loan situation is resolved, the major banks will try to capture important market shares of the regional 
banking business, with its dominance of retail activities in specific geographical regions. A strong winner 
here could be the Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, given its strong balance sheet and its well-
established ties with several regional and Second Tier regional banks. Over the past two years, retail 
banking activities such as consumer and housing loans have been growing substantially in Japan, whereas 
wholesale banking such as lending to major corporations has been on a steady downward trend. It has 
been reported that the combined loans of the around 160 largest banks to individuals were above Yen 100 
trillion for the very first time as of 30 September 2002, and that also housing loans have increased quite 
substantially [NNS, various reports]. Although it is rather difficult to specify to what extent Basel II is 
playing a role here, some interviewees believed that also here it could be playing the role of catalyst.  
 
6.1.4 Acceleration of the disposal of bad loans 
As has been explained in section 2, the New Basel Capital Accord will have huge implications for the 
capital adequacy ratios of banks with large amounts of non-performing loans. That is, the capital ratios of 
these banks may decline significantly, particularly in cases where insufficient provisions have been made. 
Dependent on the degree of provisioning, the risk weight for problem loans will increase: the lower the 
degree of provisioning, the higher the specific risk weight applied. For example, the risk weight of 
problem loans will increase to 563% when no provisions for these loans have been made at all. The study 
conducted by the FSA and BoJ for a sample group of 66 banks showed that the average risk weight 
applied to their problem loans is around 157% [NNS, 25 August 2003]. According to the same study, for 
some individual banks their overall risk-weighted assets may increase by 10 to 20% as a result of the 
implementation of Basel II [NNS, various reports]. 
 30This leads to the rather straightforward conclusion that Japanese banks better accelerate the 
disposal of their bad loans and have them reduced substantially before the implementation of the New 
Accord. Various interviewees stated that this is exactly what Japanese banks are doing now (as discussed 
in section 3), and that Basel II is playing a role. Of course, several other forces play an important role here 
as well, such as the increased pressure of the FSA on the major banks to resolve their bad loans and the 
aim of Japanese banks to limit government interference with their business, which was the price they had 
to pay for receiving public capital injections. In this respect, it should be noted that the BoJ, regarding the 
results of the study involving 66 banks which showed a very modest impact of Basel II on risk-weighted 
assets and capital rations, has clearly stated that these results are conditional on the banks’ bad loan 
disposal: “It is expected that Japanese banks will not face any difficulties with respect to the 
implementation of the New Capital Accord if they are committed to deal with the disposal of their non-
performing loans by the end of fiscal year 2006” [own translation, Bank of Japan (2003i)]. 
 
6.1.5 Negative impact on competitiveness of Japanese banks in derivatives business 
Finally, the last tactical implication of Basel II on Japanese banks that has been identified was the 
possible negative impact of the treatment of foreign exposure (counterparty risk) on derivatives business. 
Credit risk exposures of foreign banks to Japanese banks could be charged with higher risk weights, both 
under the standardized approach and the IRB approach. This because these weights are related to the 
ratings of Japanese banks as one option under the former and may be even higher in the internal risk 
ratings of foreign banks under the latter approach [JP Morgan Securities, (2001)]. Given the importance 
of inter-bank credit exposures in the derivatives business, this could to some extent affect negatively the 
competitiveness of Japanese banks in derivatives.  
 
6.1.6 Possible positive impact of the use of ratings from Japanese rating agencies 
One private sector analyst expressed that Japanese banks could have a competitive advantage because of 
the enhanced importance of ratings from private sector rating agencies under Basel II. Namely, it has been 
claimed that the ratings of the two main domestic Japanese rating agencies, i.e. JCR and R&I, have been 
more lenient for Japanese banks then the ratings from the main international operating agencies such as 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’ s and Fitch Ratings [see also JP Morgan Securities (2001a)]. Because banks 
may use the highest rating in case there are two or more ratings available, this could lead to reduced 
capital needs for Japanese banks. 
 
 316.2 Strategic implications 
6.2.1 On the one hand: In general, hamper the development of securitization in Japan 
The New Basel Capital Accord introduces internationally harmonized regulations regarding the 
supervisory treatment of securitization activities. These activities have developed enormously since the 
introduction of the original Capital Accord. Under Basel I, banks often used securitization to lower 
effective capital requirements, whereas at the same time credit risk was not reduced [Jones (2000); 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2001); Federal Reserve (2003)]. This practice of regulatory arbitrage (see section 
2) will be frustrated severely by Basel II, as in the proposed framework the rules for securitization will 
become much stricter.
24  
  As regarding the perceived impact of the New Basel Capital Accord on the securitization market 
in Japan, a significant majority of interviewees agreed that its development could be hampered by the 
implementation of Basel II. This, first, because of certain legal and practical peculiarities of securitization 
in Japan, which in the view of several interviewees are not satisfactory taken into account in the Basel II 
proposals. Second, interviewees emphasized that the market for securitization in Japan is still in its early 
stage (“infant industry” argument), and that the necessary catch-up with the major overseas markets may 
be thwarted by the implementation of the New Accord. Third, the concern was raised that the treatment of 
securitization under Basel II will provide non-banks, i.e. in particular foreign non-banks, a competitive 
edge vis-à-vis banks in Japan. Finally, interviewees feared that the stipulations concerning securitization 
may frustrate significantly the development of related new financial instruments and techniques (financial 
innovations) [see also Rodriguez (2002)]. To a large extent, the concerns raised by the interviewees, of 
whom many were not employed by Japanese banks, follow the official comments on securitization of 
Japanese banking institutions and organizations on the various consultative papers published by the Basel 
Committee. Therefore, the published reaction of Japanese banks on the securitization proposals will be 
discussed first. Subsequently, an overview of the Japanese securitization market will be presented. Then, 
the possible consequences of the Basel II proposals are analyzed for the various segments of the 
securitization market in Japan.  
The Japanese Bankers Association (JBA) and six overseas financial industry groups submitted 
proposals in August 2003 to the Basel Committee aimed at mitigating concerns about the negative 
implications of the New Capital Accord for the securitization market [See Seven Market Organizations 
(2003)].
25  Under the current proposals, banks active in securitization could be faced with a rather 
                                                  
24 Of course, it needs to be seen to what extent financial innovations will undermine in practice the goal of Basel II of effectively 
reducing regulatory arbitrage. Because of the greater use of securitization instruments, such as certain derivatives and asset-
backed securities, and the related increase in certain risks, some have argued that capital ratios of 8% are too low to effectively 
cover for these risks [see Gup (2003)]. Regarding the impact of risk-based capital requirements on the development of 
securitization, Jagtiani et al. (1995) could not find a consistent impact of these requirements on the speed of diffusion across 
banks’ off-balance sheet activities. See also Donahoo and Shaffer (1991). 
25 See in this respect for example Risk (2003d), which quotes D. Jenkins of the American Securitization Forum as follows: 
 32substantial increase in their risk-weighted assets and consequently their capital adequacy rules could fall. 
In addition, separately the JBA discussed securitization aspects in its formal and published reactions on 
the various consultative papers published by the Basel Committee, which was also done by the 
Norinchukin Bank and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation. Their main concern was the “infant 
industry” argument mentioned above, i.e. the asset securitization market in Japan is still under-developed, 
so that Basel II could adversely impact its future development. The issues raised by these institutions 
addressed mainly six requests: lowering of the risk weights for securitization instruments, permission to 
use private ratings, more favorable treatment of liquidity facilities under Asset Backed Commercial Paper 
(ABCP) programs, less severe treatment of banks that provide so-called “implicit recourse”, adoption of a 
more positive approach towards the securitization of own-bank assets, and the permission of early 
amortization.
26 The first request entails that the risk weights for securitization instruments need to be 
reduced, since the risk weights of these instruments that hold the same credit rating as corporate 
instruments are higher, both under the standardized approach and the internal rating based (IRB) approach. 
Especially the criteria regarding below-investment grade (BB+ or below) securitization instruments differ 
substantially from those for corporate instruments, and therefore it is requested that these risk weights are 
lowered. Regarding the second request, it is argued that private ratings (i.e. non-disclosed ratings) should 
be permitted in parallel to public ratings, which is against the current proposal of the New Accord that 
private ratings do not qualify. Although the JBA agreed that there are differences between published and 
non-published ratings, it argued that there is no essential difference in the calculation and monitoring 
processes of these ratings themselves. This view is supported by Rating & Investment Information (R&I), 
one of the two leading local rating agencies in Japan [R&I (2003)]. This company stated that historically, 
few individual financial transactions have been published in Japan. Therefore, it proposed that in Japan 
private ratings and published ratings should be treated equally until the further development of financial 
markets has been established and the general use of public ratings is accepted. As regards the third request, 
i.e. the more favorable treatment of liquidity facilities under ABCP programs, under the 1988 Basel 
Capital Accord, a bank that supports ABCP conduits (i.e. Special Purpose Companies (SPC) or Entities 
(SPE) involved in the securitization process), and of which it has guaranteed the payment of principal by 
providing liquidity support, does not have to make risk-related provisions. However, this will change 
under the New Basel Capital Accord, as risk weights applied to liquidity enhancements of ABCP conduits 
                                                                                                                                                                  
“There is still a bias against securitization – that part hasn’t changed in CP3”. 
26 The treatment of securitization under Basel II is a highly technical exercise beyond the scope of this chapter. A very good 
overview of the issues is provided in Kothari (2003a). Regarding Japan, only the main issues will be described briefly. Implicit 
recourse occurs when a bank provides credit support beyond its contractual obligation to one or more of its securitizations. A 
bank that provides this non-contractual support does so to preserve its reputation and its future access to securitization markets. 
However, by protecting investors from losses, the bank is exposed to higher levels of credit risk and liquidity risk. See FDIC 
(2002). Early amortization events are credit enhancing features outlined in the prospectus of securitization deals. When triggered, 
for example by supervisory actions, they can result in the termination of the revolving period of the transaction and may lead to 
liquidity or earnings problems. See Deutsche Bank (2003a) and OCC et. al. (2002). 
 33will be generally be set at 100%. Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (SMBC) requested in its official 
comments that this application of a uniform risk weight of 100% should not be adopted. The Norinchukin 
Bank regarded the treatment of liquidity facilities as excessively stringent and asked for a review based 
on the actual risks related to these facilities. The JBA criticized the treatment of eligible liquidity facilities 
under the IRB approach, since the assignment of risk weights is different. All in all, the concern of these 
organizations is that, since in Japan securitization is still in the development stage, Basel II should not 
hamper the development and market position of the specific securitization instruments and practices 
which are currently used most predominantly. The other requests are explained briefly. As regards the 
issue of implicit recourse, applying excessive penalties to banks which are found to have provided 
implicit recourse was deemed to be harmful to the development of the market. From the perspective of 
being the originator of a securitization product, Japanese banks requested that the securitization of a 
bank’s own assets should at least not increase the bank’s regulatory capital requirement. It was also 
emphasized that under loan participation practices in Japan, the removal of assets from a banks’ balance 
sheet is recognized as an off-balance sheet item under Japanese accounting standards. Furthermore, 
Japanese banks criticized the stipulation under Basel II that early amortization in the context of 
securitization should not be allowed, because they regard this as discriminatory treatment. For example, 
credit-linked notes and similar products do have provisions for early amortization, for example because of 
prepayment of the underlying assets [see Kothari (2003a)].  
Most requests mentioned above are views related to banks being active in securitization 
transactions as originators and sponsors. However, requests and questions regarding the treatment of 
banks being investors in securitization products were also raised by Japanese banking organizations. For 
example, the Norinchukin Bank requested that the higher risk weights applied to securitization assets 
acquired should be brought in line with the treatment of corporate bonds. 
Regarding the actual development of the securitization market in Japan, it is clear that this market 
has been growing quite rapidly during the past several years and is now the third largest market in the 
world. However, in terms of size, as is shown in Table 8, it is still far behind the US and European Union 
(for reference purposes the syndicated loan market, another relative new market in Japan, is shown as 
well). 
 
 34Table 8 Comparison of issuance activity in the securitization and syndicated loan markets in 2002 
(in Yen trillion)  
    Securitization market  Syndicated loan market 
Japan 5  15 
The United States  334  116 
European Union  20  64 
Source: Bank of Japan, Market Review, “Kurejitto Sijyo Kaikaku to Nihon Ginko no Torikumi,”[“Credit markets reform and the achievement of 
the Bank of Japan]. 
Note: ABCP is excluded from the figures for the securitization market 
 
 
The differences in size can be explained by the fact that the various more advanced segments of credit 
markets such as the syndicated loan market, non-recourse loan market,
27 securitization market and credit 
derivatives market were until recently not very well developed in Japan. New issuance of securitization 
products in Japan in 2002 amounted to about Yen 5 trillion, which is much smaller than the Yen 334 
trillion in the same year in the United States. However, the size of the Japanese market has been growing 
steadily during recent years, which is shown in Tables 9 and 10. Residential Mortgage Backed Securities 
(RMBS) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), which mainly consist of Collateralized Bond 
Obligations (CBOs) and Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs), appear to hold the greatest promise 
among the various market segments. Furthermore, products related to the real estate sector, such as 
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS), could also see increased activity as a result of the 
securitization of non-recourse loans. In addition, government-affiliated financial institutions are expected 
to make greater use of securitization techniques as well [Deutsche Bank (2003b)]. Issuance volume in the 
first half of 2003 has clearly been supported by the CDO sector, mainly by originating banks which have 
been using them to reduce their risk-weighted assets [NNS, 23 July 2003]. The share of banks’ issuance in 
the total amount of securitized products issued rose to 42% in 2003, from 26% one year earlier (see Table 
10). This process will be discussed in more detail in the next subsection. 
 
                                                  
27 Non-recourse loans are loans secured by collateral, but the lending bank is only entitled to repayment of the loan from the 
profits generated from the project that this loan funded and not from other assets of the borrower, if the borrower defaults on the 
loan. 
 35Table 9 Japanese securitization products (according to underlying assets) 
(in percentages) 






RMBS CMBS CDO  Others 
Jan.-Dec. 
2001  0.242 0.161 0.153  0.14  0.174 0.068  0.062 
Jan.-Dec. 
2002  0.187  0.1  0.132 0.206 0.127 0.143  0.104 
Jan.-Sep. 
2003  0.125 0.111 0.059 0.184 0.088 0.307  0.127 
Source: Deutsche Bank Group 
 
 
Table 10 Japanese securitization market (by sector) 
 
    Consumer 
Credit  













2001  0.243 0.221 0.113 0.059 0.062 0.042 0.036  -  0.224 
Jan.-Dec. 
2002  0.169 0.155 0.258 0.097 0.104 0.057 0.036 0.002 0.123 
Jan.-Sep. 
2003  0.129 0.115  0.42  0.044 0.091 0.022 0.061  -  0.118 
Source: Deutsche Bank Group 
 
 
However, despite its attractiveness as a financing tool and a vehicle to improve balance sheets, 
securitization is not still widely used in Japan [see for example Deloitte & Touche (2002)]. As is stated in 
Kanda (1998), there are both legal and non-legal factors inhibiting the securitization market in Japan. As 
legal obstacles can be mentioned, first, that compliance with the legal requirements for perfecting an asset 
transfer is costly, and second, that this requires notarial certification of individual loans. Furthermore, the 
regulatory structure of the securities industry in Japan is complex and rigid, reflecting a long political 
history in which various ministries had jurisdiction over specific industries. Non-legal obstacles to the 
further development of the market for securitization in Japan that can be mentioned are specific 
regulatory characteristics, political factors, interaction among the various ministries involved and 
fragmentation of financial markets [see for more details: Ohgaki (1996): Kanda (1998)]. One positive 
development has been that recently it has become cheaper to set up a Special Purpose Entity (SPE), which 
now requires a minimum amount of capital of only Yen 100,000. 
Given that the securitization could play a much more important role in financing and risk-hedging 
activities in Japan, the BoJ has started to support actively the development of this market. In order to 
contribute to smooth corporate financing, the BoJ has recognized ABCP as eligible collateral and has 
started purchasing ABCP from February 2002 [Bank of Japan (2003g); see also Shimizu et. al. (2002)]. 
From July 2003, the BoJ expanded the range of eligible assets and added asset-backed securities (ABS) 
 36backed by housing loan credits and real estate to its eligible collateral [see: Ishiga et. al. (2003); Sugihara 
et. al. (2003); BoJ (2003a) and (2003c)]. Although the BoJ’s purchases of ABCP and ABS aimed to 
promote further growth in the use of these instruments as well, it is feared that the New Basel Capital 
Accord may thwart this attempt. There are serious concerns that the ABCP market might be downsized 
due to the implementation of Basel II [NNS, 26 September 2003]. This is because under the New Accord, 
there are some notable changes to the risk weightings applied to ABCP, which are regulatory securitized 
products in Japan. Under the New Accord, these assets can have a maximum risk weight of 200%, 
compared with 0% under Basel I. One market participant expected that after the envisaged 
implementation of Basel II at the end of 2006, due to these heavy weights, the ABCP market in Japan 
could be halved. In its present proposal, the Basel Committee follows the line that so-called liquidity 
support to ABCP conduits might actually be serving as a credit enhancement mechanism [Kothari 
(2003a)]. Unless this treatment has been modified, it is to be expected that the Japanese ABCP market 
will be affected negatively by the implementation of the New Capital Accord.   
  In reaction to the proposed treatment of ABCP under Basel II, Mizuho Corporate Bank has issued 
Yen 100 billion in ABCP without back-up lines, and also other banks have started to plan issuing ABCP 
without repayment guarantees [NNS, 8 July 2003]. This because under the New Capital Accord, some 
part of the commercial paper issued by banks with repayment guarantees will be considered being risk-
weighted assets, and thus lower banks’ capital adequacy ratios. Furthermore, the BoJ announced in 
October 2003 that it would review the specific problems of the Japanese securitization market in order to 
promote its growth, and to that purpose, it established a study-group (so-called “Securitization Forum”) in 
November 2003 [Hirata and Shimizu (2003); NNS, 26 October 2003].
28 Thus, it seems that not only 
market participants, but possibly the supervisory authorities as well, are concerned about the negative 
impact of Basel II on the development of the securitization market in Japan.   
  All in all, there was widespread concern among both interviewees and the banking institutions 
which reacted formerly to the Basel Committee’s proposals that, given the underdeveloped nature of the 
securitization market in Japan and, as was discussed above, the existing legal and non-legal problems that 
obstruct its rapid development, the introduction of the New Capital Accord could seriously hamper the 
expansion and deepening of the market for securitized products in Japan. Thus, because of the relatively 
underdeveloped nature of securitization in Japan, Basel II could turn out to be a heavy blow to this young 
market.  
The strong growth of the securitization market in Japan in the course of 2003 has been heavily 
influenced by the use of credit-risk related securitization instruments by banks to reduce their risk-
weighted assets and credit-risk exposure in the context of resolving their balance sheet problems (see 
                                                  
28 The Forum concluded in November 2003 that the major obstacles in the securitization market in Japan are a lack of liquidity 
due to a limited number of investors, a cumbersome process of transferring assets to SPVs and the existence of certain high costs 
 37Table 10 and in more detail subsection 6.2.2). In this respect, there is a clear and direct connection with 
the bad loan problems. It has been argued by many that securitization could be an excellent tool to solve 
or mitigate the non-performing loan problems in Japan [see for example: Herr and Miyazaki (1999); 
Deloitte & Touche (2002); Euromoney, 15 May 2002].
29 Thus, if the New Basel Capital Accord would 
affect negatively the market for securitization in Japan, then the contribution of this instrument to 
resolving the bad loan problems would be affected negatively as well. Of course, it is difficult to calculate 
the net effect, as the use of securitization instruments under the proposed framework of Basel II will be 
more heavily charged with capital. Thus, on the one hand, securitization could mitigate capital needs by 
reducing bad loans and risk-weighted assets; however, on the other hand, most likely the use of these 
instruments itself would lead to higher capital charges.   
 
6.2.2 On the other hand: More specific, catalyst for the development of risk-transfer instruments 
Contrary to the general negative impact of the New Capital Accord on securitization, in the view of a 
considerable number of interviewees the use of specific securitization instruments which aim at the 
transfer of credit risk could actually be promoted by the Accord, because of the greater emphasis on 
(capital) risk-management and credit risk considerations in Basel II. As expressed by one interviewee, the 
key-word for Japanese banks in the context of Basel II is risk-transfer, which is now possible due to the 
introduction of new technologies and financial engineering. This applies in particular to the use of credit 
derivatives, but also to various kinds of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) which were discussed in 
the previous subsection.
30 
  Regarding the use of credit derivatives in the Japanese banking sector, the total amount of credit 
derivatives’ contracts increased from USD 13.95 billion at end-December 2002 to USD 22.91 billion at 
end-June 2003, a staggering increase of 64% in six months (see Table 11). This was fully due to the 
growth in the use of credit default swaps with 75%, in particular the amount of contracts bought which 
increased by 87%. Thus, Japanese banks have been buying protection against credit risk exposure in 
particular, in the context of their considerable balance sheet problems [see also various reports, NNS, 
2003]. Some market analysts expressed the view that Basel II considerations could have played a role, 
although minor, as well.  Although the use of credit derivatives may be affected negatively by Basel II as 
                                                                                                                                                                  
for securitization practices [NNS, 13 November 2003]. 
29  Specialized securitization products have been developed by (foreign) investment banks which aimed at contributing to 
resolving the bad loan situation. An example is the introduction of non-performing loan backed commercial mortgage-backed 
securities (NPL-backed CMBS), see JP Morgan (2001).   
30 Credit derivatives are swap, forward and option contracts that allow one party (protection buyer or originator) to transfer credit 
risk of a reference asset, which it may or may not own, to one or more other parties, without actually transferring the ownership 
of the underlying asset [Kothari (2003b); Kiff and Morrow (2000), p.3]. The three major types of credit derivatives are credit 
default swaps (CDS), which are the most important category, total return swaps and credit-spread put options. In addition, they 
can be embedded in credit linked notes, which are a securitized form of credit derivatives. See also Merrill Lynch (2003) and 
Barclays Capital (2003). See for Japan: Ito and Harada (2003). 
 38well, which is related to the specific definition that will be used in the case of default,
31 the expectation is 
that the combined impact of the resolution of the bad loan problems in Japan in parallel with the 
implementation of Basel II will stimulate the further development of these instruments.
32 This particularly 
so given that credit derivatives could be used as effective buffers to mitigate procyclicality concerns, 
which may be relevant for Japan (see subsection 6.2.6). 
 
Table 11 The use of credit derivatives in Japan 
(in millions of USD) 
 Credit Derivatives Jun-99 Dec-99 Jun-00 Dec-00 Jun-01 Dec-01 Jun-02 Dec-02 Jun-03
Total OTC Contracts 11,159 16,538 14,691 13,281 14,309 17,432 16,363 13,951 22,914
(64%)
  Credit Event / Default Swaps (Sold and Bought) 10,230 12,831 12,248 11,698 12,815 15,127 14,442 12,446 21,727
(75%)
      Credit Event / Default Swaps (Sold) 5,173 3,388 3,259 3,599 4,275 4,357 6,250 4,557 6,973
(53%)
      Credit Event / Default Swaps (Bought) 5,057 9,443 8,989 8,099 8,540 10,770 8,192 7,889 14,754
(87%)
  Total Return Swaps (Sold and Bought) 338 2,707 1,630 956 888 1,269 973 443 377
      Total Return Swaps (Sold) 65 1,289 459 0 19 175 175 411 0
      Total Return Swaps (Bought) 273 1,418 1,171 956 869 1,094 798 32 377
  Credit Spread Products (Sold and Bought) 3 6 1 600006 1 5
      Credit Spread Products (Sold) 3 6 1 600003 8
      Credit Spread Products (Bought) 0000003 7
  Credit-Linked Notes (issuance and purchase) 502 921 731 561 550 1,024 887 992 734
      Credit-Linked Notes (issuance) 270 629 591 561 144 0 0 0 0
      Credit-Linked Notes (purchase) 232 292 140 0 406 1,024 887 992 734
  Others (Sold and Bought) 55 55 82 67 55 12 55 55 55
      Others (Sold) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5060 0
      Others (Bought) 0 0 27 12 55 6 55 55 55
Source: Bank of Japan. Historical Data Series on 'The Results of the Regular Derivatives Market Statistics in Japan (Yoshikuni Statistics)' 
Note:  Figures for credit derivatives are available from end-June 1999. Credit derivative figures are not collected by the BIS 







Regarding the use of other instruments that may be used to reduce credit risk exposure of Japanese banks, 
the use of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) has been discussed in the previous subsection. One 
interviewee feared that possibly the negative effects of Basel II on this type of securitization instrument 
would be more severe than for credit derivatives, which could have some impact on the further 
development of this market segment. In Japan, the use of Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs), which 
are formally a subset of CDO’s, has been growing quite substantially in the course of 2003 in Japan as 
well, parallel to the growth in credit derivatives, as they provided substantial capital relief for Japanese 
banks [IFR (2003); NNS, various reports].
33  Table 12 shows that the cumulative issuance volume of 
CLOs during the first half of 2003 was almost 110% higher than during the first half of 2002. The 
increase use of CLOs started in the fall of 2002 when Mizuho Corporate Bank used this instrument to 
                                                  
31 In CP3, the Basel Committee mitigated to a considerable extent these concerns: “The Committee has decided to make a 
significant change to the credit risk mitigation framework after extensive and fruitful consultation with the industry”. 
32 Hiwatashi and Ashida (2003) emphasized the need for more effective risk transfer methods, which are being developed by 
insurance companies. These new products could be used to cover a wide range of operational risks. 
33 CDOs can be classified according to the various kinds of underlying assets in which they invest such as Collateralized Loan 
Obligations (CLOs) which are CDOs of leveraged bank loans, Collateralized Bond Obligations (CBOs) which are CDOs of high 
yield and investment grade bonds, and bank balance sheet CLOs which are CDOs of investment grade bank loans. See Barclays 
Capital (2003). 
 39remove Yen 1.3 trillion worth of loans from its balance sheet. This was followed by similar actions by 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation and UFJ, although smaller in size [NNS, 3 February 2003].  Table 
12 also shows that CBOs play a very minor role in Japan and that, although small in size, synthetic CBOs 
increased dramatically by more than 550%.
34   Japanese banks have been assisted in this by the 
Development Bank of Japan, which underwrote Yen 2.24 trillion of these contracts in FY2002 [NNS, 28 
March 2003]. 
 
Table 12 Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) in Japan (Yen Million) 
  2002   2003 
 Full  year  January-July  January-July 
CLOs  374,542 143,800 300,888 
CBOs  49,200 49,200 14,000 
Synthetic  CBOs  280,900 20,900 137,000 
Non-performing loans  19,100  9,600  0 
Source: Nikko CitiGroup (2003b) 
 
 
6.2.3 Catalyst for the development of the syndicated loan market in Japan 
Several interviewees expressed the view that Basel II will stimulate the syndicated loan market in Japan 
because of the increased attention for so-called concentration risk under the New Accord. That is, higher 
risk weights will be applied to large credit exposures to individual borrowers then for smaller borrowers. 
Thus, banks may want to limit their lending to individual corporate borrowers, which can be very well 
achieved in the form of syndicated loans, as they allocate various shares in the total loan among a large 
number of lenders. Syndicated loans would also be attractive from the view that they allow banks to maintain 
customer relationships, which may be squeezed under Basel II, but remove the related loans largely from 
their books. 
The amount of syndicated loans extended in Japan in the first half of fiscal 2003 increased by 
almost 36% from a year earlier to USD 64.3 billion, which made the Japanese syndicated loan market the 
third fastest growing market in the world, behind France and Germany [Goldman Sachs (2003d)]. As is 
shown in Table 13, Mizuho Financial Group has been leading the market and its amount of syndicated 
loans reached USD 22.4 billion in the first half of 2003, followed by Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group 
with USD 20.9 billion during the same period. The four major banks had a combined total amount of 
                                                  
34 Synthetic CDOs can be interpreted as credit derivatives which transfer risk on entire credit portfolios, and thereby have been 
very useful for Japanese banks to mitigate their balance sheet problems. See Merrill Lynch (2003). However, one market analyst 
expressed the view that the boom in synthetic CBOs was fully related to capital adequacy fears of major banks between 
September 2002 and March 2003 and was, as of October 2003, basically over. Mizuho Bank introduced Yen 14 billion of 
collateralized bond obligations in March 2003 [NNS, 31 March 2003]. 
 40syndicated loans of USD 56.7 billion, or 65.9% of the total Japanese market during 2002.  
 
 
Table 13 Amount of syndicated loans at the four major Japanese banks (USD Million) 
   
Amount  2002 1H  2003 1H  Year on year  2002 full year  as % of 2002 
Mizuho  18,510   22,412   21.1  36,038   62.2  
SMFG  14,090   20,888   48.3  25,592   81.6  
MTFG  6,084   9,590   57.6  17,562   54.6  
UFJ  3,067   3,785   23.4  6,795   55.7  
Total  41,751   56,674   35.7  85,987   65.9  
Source: Goldman Sachs (2003c) 
 
The main factors that promoted the syndicated loan market, in addition to a possible catalyzing role of the 
New Capital Accord, have been as follows. First, major banks saw this market as an interesting 
opportunity to collects fees, being the arranging bank, while reducing their loan concentration risk at the 
same time. According to the Bank of Japan, the major banks reported a significant increase in fees and 
commissions during FY2002, which largely came from loan syndication and commitment lines as well as 
mutual fund business and some other activities [Bank of Japan (2003a)]. The main participants in these 
syndicated loans organized by the major banks have been the regional banks and institutional investors, 
who used this opportunity to establish business relations with borrowers who had been difficult to 
approach on an individual basis, and broaden their profit capability [Hayami (2002b)]. The participation 
of regional banks is an extremely important development, as it established a much needed increase in the 
amount of risk-sharing between various Japanese banking sectors. As was discussed in section 3, the 
situation of regional banks in terms of balance sheet strength generally has been much better than that of 
the major banks, and so the growth of syndicated loans has established a much more balanced and sound 
allocation of credit risk in the Japanese financial system. Second, for companies whose credit ratings are 
at BBB or below, syndicated loans have been a cheaper way to obtain funds rather than issuing corporate 
bonds, which allowed them to diversify their corporate financing. A possible third factor that can be 
mentioned is the announcement of the BoJ to consider purchasing syndicated loans as eligible collateral 
for its lending operations. As syndicated loans to SME’s had been increasing, the BoJ has been studying 
the possibility of accepting syndicated loans as eligible assets in order to enhance corporate financing and 
to foster the development of the syndicated loan market [Bank of Japan (2003f)]. 
 
6.2.4 Pressure on the segmented structure of the Japanese banking system 
In the view of a considerable number of interviewees, the New Basel Capital Accord may be an important 
impetus for structural reform in the Japanese financial system, as the Accord is expected to promote 
 41further consolidation in the banking sector. As was discussed in section 3, the Japanese financial system 
is still characterized by significant degree of market segmentation, with for example specialized financial 
institutions for small businesses and agriculture financing. Given the likely move towards greater 
attention for retail banking activities at the large banks, the smaller banks may get squeezed in the process 
and feel themselves forced to reconsider their activities and strategies. Various market analysts observed 
considerable concerns at smaller banks in this respect, although the ultimate net impact may be somewhat 
mitigated because these banks will also benefit from the lowered risk weights for their traditional business 
areas such as SME financing. Basel II may also inhibit the further diversification of activities by the large 
financial groups, which currently do not possess major insurance operations, and may put existing 
informal relations with the insurance sector under pressure. It has been argued by many that the New 
Accord will frustrate the continuation of the universal banking and bancassurance models, to a 
considerable extent because of the introduction of capital charges for operational risk [see for example: 
Morgan Stanley (2003a) and (2003b); JP Morgan Securities (2001a) and (2001b)]. As result, the practice 




6.2.5 Catalyst for more market-based credit markets 
Furthermore, interviewees saw the introduction of the New Basel Capital Accord as a welcome 
opportunity to promote in Japan the move towards more emphasis on market-based credit pricing and 
thus ultimately towards a more efficient allocation of credit at the macro-level. This mainly because under 
Basel II banks will have to differentiate credit risk much more importantly at the level of the individual 
borrower than was the case under Basel I. Smith (2002) has shown that loan spreads in Japan are 
substantially lower, on average, then in the US and major European countries. This study also concluded 
that Japanese banks reflected differences in credit risk much less in their rates than foreign banks in the 
Japanese market, i.e. they were “… willing to offer lower-priced loans to a riskier set of Japanese 
borrowers”, and did not distinguish between good and bad risks. Peek and Rosengren (2003) 
demonstrated that Japanese banks extended an increasing share of their loans to troubled borrowers, in 
order to keep them afloat and by doing so avoiding to have to report more bad loans (plus related 
provisions) which would affect their capital adequacy ratios negatively. They claim that the resulting 
misallocation of credit inhibited the needed restructuring of the Japanese economy and adversely affected 
the long-run prospects for growth. It is difficult to predict to what extent exactly the New Accord will 
result in credit risk and credit costs being reflected much more accurately in Japanese lending rates. This 
would also require a better relationship between the pricing (i.e. economic value) of a loan and the value 
                                                  
35 The important mutual capital links between Japanese banks and life insurance companies have been criticized in Fukao (2002), BIS 
(2003) and IMF (2003). 
 42of the underlying collateral, in other words would require an improvement in collateral management by 
Japanese banks. In this respect, an important question is whether banks can move from collateral-based 
lending, in Japan often characterized by insufficient considerations for fundamental economic values, 
towards lending more based on risk-return considerations. The need for improvement of lending practices 
in the Japanese market has been identified clearly in various reports published by the Bank of Japan. For 
example, Miyauchi (2003) discussed the need for the adoption of a new lending model by Japanese banks, 
as various factors such as a lack of covenants in loan agreements, credit management based on loan 
continuation, unclear loss-sharing rules and underdeveloped secondary markets for loan assets, in 
combination with existing provisioning rules, hinder Japanese banks from acting swiftly against 
deteriorating loans. Bank of Japan (2003b) also argued in favor of the need to change the traditional 
lending practices of Japanese banks and the importance of discounted cash flow (DCF) methods for 
establishing the economic value of loans, which Japanese banks started to adopt in FY2002. All in all, 
several interviewees expressed a careful optimism that the introduction of the New Basel Capital Accord 
will promote this development towards a more market-oriented lending model in the Japanese credit 
markets.   
 
6.2.6 Macro-economic impact of the New Basel Capital Accord 
Finally, in addition to the effects on the functioning of the Japanese lending markets and the allocation of 
credit, there could be other macro-economic implications stemming from the introduction of Basel II by 
Japanese banks. The impact of risk-based capital adequacy ratios on macro-economic variables such as 
aggregate lending and economic activity has been extensively discussed in the academic community, in 
particular after the development of Basel I in the second half of the eighties.
36 Regarding the possible 
effects of Basel II in this respect, it has been argued that the IRB approach will lead to increased volatility 
and cyclical sensitivity of the minimum capital requirements of banks that choose for this methodology, 
suggesting the need for dynamic provisioning and capital buffers in order to avoid capital constraints 
during periods of deteriorating economic conditions [see ECB (2001b), pp.64ff]. This could pose a 
significant challenge indeed in the case of Japan, given the high degree of concentration in the Japanese 
banking market in general and the large market share of the Big Four financial groups in particular. If the 
IRB approach were to be adopted by Japanese banks, it will be among the largest banks. Given their 
dominant position in the lending market, the increased pro-cyclical impact of the New Capital Accord 
could exacerbate economic downturns, as the increased capital needs of the banks that adopted the IRB 
approach may force them to reduce their lending even more. Furthermore, it has been argued, for example 
                                                  
36 For general studies of macro-economic implications of risk-based capital adequacy requirements and pro-cyclicality concerns 
see for example: Blum and Hellwig (1995); Corcóstegui et. al. (2003); Heid (2003). For more specific studies that investigate the 
impact of these requirements on aggregate lending (credit crunch studies) see: B.J. Hall (1993); Berger and Udell (1994); 
Brinkmann and Horvitz (1995); Peek and Rosengren (1995a); Thakor (1996). For investigation of capital crunch studies see for 
 43by Allan Greenspan, that due to the limited capability of Japanese capital markets to provide back-up 
financing when Japanese banks cannot perform their intermediation role, the Japanese financial system is 
relatively vulnerable to shocks [Greenspan (1999); see also Weinstein and Yafeh (1998)]. As has been 
documented extensively elsewhere, the Japanese financial system is still characterized by a dominance of 
bank-based financing [see for example: ECB (2001a)]. Although the published BIS Q&A mimeograph of 
the Bank of Japan downplayed the risk of credit-crunch type of situations in relation to Basel II, it needs 
to be seen what the actual impact will be. In any case, the Japanese Bankers Association seems to be more 




This chapter has asserted that the New Basel Capital Accord is an important catalyst in shaping the 
business practices and structure of the Japanese banking industry in the years to come. This in parallel 
with other factors such as the resolution of the bad loan problems, the economic recovery and related 
performance of the stock market, the political climate and the proliferation of political interests, the 
process of financial innovations and the significance of international competitive forces. Generally and 
publicly, Japanese banks seem to be less worried about the effects of the New Accord on their business 
then they were at the time of the development and implementation of the Original Accord.
37 However, it 
has to be said that most Japanese banks are quite reluctant to discuss the issue of Basel II. For example, a 
large number of non-Japanese bank related private sector analysts expressed in personal interviews that 
they simply do not know what the exact position of most individual Japanese banks on the New Capital 
Accord is, and that Japanese banks hide behind perceived “vagueness” on the side of the FSA in this 
matter: as long as they do not know the specific Basel II related guidelines of the FSA, they do not have 
to take a position. This attitude could be interpreted somewhat positively as observed ambivalence which 
could be explained by the fact that the Accord does not have an impact on the definition of capital, as the 
numerator of the capital adequacy ratio is not changed. However, as was shown in section 3, the capital 
position of Japanese banks is still weak and needs to be strengthened substantially.
38 If  Japanese 
accounting firms were to adopt the same tough stance as Resona Bank’s auditors, and lower significantly 
the amount of DTA’s in Tier I capital, one would have to fear for the solvency of several major Japanese 
banks. That is, the discretionary power of Japanese accounting firms to apply accounting rules strictly or 
                                                                                                                                                                  
example Peek and Rosengren (1995b). 
37 A notable exception is Mr. R. Masunaga of the Japan Centre for International Finance (JCIF) who declared that “… the Basel 
reforms could lead to the reappearance of the Japan Premium (in interbank markets)” [Risk (2001d)]. 
38 Fitch Ratings (2003b) calculated that as of end-March 2003, the “pure” Tier I capital of Japanese banks, correcting for DTA’s, 
public funds and preferred instruments, was actually negative.  
 44not hangs as Damocles’ sword over the Japanese banking industry. Furthermore, it has to be said that 
Japanese banks are not out of the danger zone in terms of the current development of the New Capital 
Accord, as regarding the definition of capital under Basel II the door seems not to be fully closed yet. In 
the September 2003 issue of the Federal Reserve Bulletin, it is explicitly stated that “… however, the 
definition of regulatory capital under Basel II remains under consideration by the Basel Committee” 
(footnote 5, p.398). The adoption of a stricter capital definition would lower the solvency levels of most 
of the major Japanese banks dramatically, almost overnight and most certainly, below 8%. It also needs to 
be emphasized that as long as the credit costs of Japanese banks are higher than their earnings capacity, 
their capital base will continue to erode. Thus, for a fundamental solution of Japanese banks’ problems, it 
is of the utmost importance that they improve significantly and fundamentally profitability [see also 
Deutsche Bank (2003c)]. 
  Furthermore, the implementation of the New Capital Accord may increase to some extent 
financial stability concerns in the Japanese financial system. For example, the “Bubble” economy was to 
a large extent caused by increased competition between various sectors in the Japanese financial system 
due to financial liberalization and financial innovations: when certain groups of financial institutions 
became squeezed as a result, they engaged more and more in excessive risky lending activities. If Basle II 
were to effectively establish the same pressures, for example due to increased competition in retail 
banking activities between segmented industries and markets, attention will have to be paid to avoid that 
history repeats itself. Furthermore, as has been shown in section 6, the use of securitization and credit 
derivatives has grown very fast over a very small period of time. Several bodies, including the BIS, have 
warned for the inherent risks embodied in the use of these instruments for financial stability, in particular 
for the risks of credit default swaps [BIS (2003); see also FT, 30 September 2003]. One may hope that the 
price to be paid for short-term mitigation of credit risk exposure and banks’ balance sheet restructuring 
will not be an increase in systemic risk in the long run.
39 
It is clear that Basel II will also have important consequences for the specific operation of 
national supervisors as well. Under the second pillar of the New Capital Accord – i.e. the supervisory 
review process – their role is enhanced substantially [see ECB (2001b)]. They will have to monitor 
closely the credit risk assessments of banks, which in certain cases will undoubtedly become much more 
complex, and intervene where deemed necessary. The supervisory authorities will be faced with 
substantially higher demands in terms of expertise and supervisory capacities in order to be able to 
exercise the role assigned to them under the second pillar.  
Furthermore, it is clear that the IRB approach contains significant subjective elements, for 
example the calculation of the risk weights based on the banks own internal ratings which need to be 
                                                  
39 From a completely different perspective, J. Frye of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago argued that Basel II could propagate 
similar financial problems experienced by Japan after the collapse of its “Bubble” among countries. See Risk (2001b). 
 45approved by the regulatory authorities. Given the high degree of subjectivity, the success of Basel II is 
directly linked to an objective application of the rules that would establish a level-playing field between 
banks, both nationally and internationally.
40 Based on information obtained from various interviews, the 
subjective character of Basel II is generally not favored by Japanese banks, which experienced a 
substantial degree of supervisory discretion during the height of the recent banking crisis, and see it as an 
important legal risk. One of the most important lessons from the Japanese banking crisis is that discretion 
and subjective regulation have serious drawbacks compared with rule-based and objective prudential 
supervision, as they easily establish supervisory frameworks of a rather opaque nature. This lesson should 
not be forgotten. 
Furthermore, given the high degree of subjectivity and judgment under Basel II, it is clear why 
there is the need for the third pillar of market discipline. If the responsibilities and requirements under the 
first and second pillars are not effectuated in a correct manner, outside market participants such as rating 
organizations have to discipline both banks and supervisors. This requires adequate disclosure and 
transparency practices, and the elimination of discrete and informal legal frameworks which constitute 
considerable legal risks for the banks involved as well. For anyone who has been following Japanese 
banking, in particular during the past 10 years, the only conclusion can be that disclosure and 
transparency were often not promoted and not established effectively [Van Rixtel (2002)].
41 In the past 
years, the Japanese government in general and the FSA in particular have taken important steps in order 
to mitigate these concerns, but as has been argued quite persuasively by the IMF, there seems still room 
for improvement [IMF (2003)]. In this respect, it will be very interesting to see which specific initiatives 
will be developed in order to further promote compliance with market discipline, such as the frequency 
and content of disclosure by Japanese banks. 
  Finally and most essentially, the question arises why Basel II will work in Japan where Basel I 
seemed to have failed. That is, the 1988 Capital Accord did not prevent the banking crisis in Japan to 
emerge in the first place and failed to correct it in the second place. Of course, one could argue that this is 
too much to expect from a relatively limited regulatory framework that aimed rather exclusively on 
maintaining a certain level of solvency ratios. On the other hand, the criticism has been raised that Basel I, 
instead of mitigating the problems in the Japanese banking sector, rather exacerbated them. That is, the 
major Japanese banks started to focus predominantly on maintaining their capital adequacy ratios above 
8% and in this process used every available trick of the book. Over the past 10 years, a continuous pattern 
of artificially under-reporting of non-performing loan problems and over-reporting of capital levels has 
                                                  
40 Rodriguez (1999), p.15, states that “… Basel II leaves so much discretion to national regulators that one could make the case 
that international capital standards have ceased to exist, even if there is still an international agreement on capital standards”. See 
also Euromoney (2001). 
41 For example, Shrieves and Dahl (1998) concluded that during the period 1989-1996 the discretionary accounting behavior of 
Japanese banks was instrumental in enabling them to comply with the BIS capital adequacy rules. 
 
 46characterized Japanese banks’ reporting practices, often aided by discretionary changes in accounting 
rules and other ad-hoc policy measures. Actually, Japanese banks have been quite successful in this 
respect: basically all financial institutions that collapsed showed on the eve of their bankruptcy capital 
ratios perfectly in line with Basel I stipulations, i.e. well above 8%. The existence of extensive informal 
business networks between banks and non-financial corporations, aided by the “Main Bank” system and 
relationship banking, and of widespread mutual stakes of financial institutions in each other’s affiliates 
made it possible to hide bad loans relatively easy from supervisory inspections. This lesson absolutely 
strengthens the case for much more disclosure in general and greater use of consolidated accounting 
practices in particular, for example with respect to reported figures on non-performing loans. It is clear 
that Basel II tries to address some of these shortcomings by introducing the second and third pillars which 
may be of considerable importance in the case of Japan. In this respect, the New Capital Accord is 
certainly a major improvement compared with its predecessor. Theoretically, it will provide Japanese 
banks with a much more balanced framework to take economically much better founded risk-return and 
portfolio decisions than under Basel I. Theoretically, it gives Japanese supervisors a considerably 
enhanced set of tools under the combined structure of three pillars to implement more effective policy 
decisions, as it does for other countries as well. Practically, in the end, it is also clear that if Basel II were 
to achieve its aims in Japan, important changes in Japanese banks’ lending practices need to be achieved 
first, such as a much better reflection of credit risk in banks’ interest rate spreads. It is to be hoped that the 
looming introduction of Basel II will function indeed as a strong catalyst in this respect.  
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